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AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AND  
MISCLASSIFICATION STATUTES 
ANNA DEKNATEL AND LAUREN HOFF-DOWNING* 
Across the country, employers frequently misclassify workers as independent 
contractors, avoiding obligations to pay minimum wages and overtime, as well as unemployment, 
payroll, workers’ compensation, and Social Security taxes. Marking employees as independent 
contractors not only harms workers, but also shrinks states’ coffers and burdens businesses that 
comply with the law. In recent years, states have responded to reports of widespread 
misclassification by passing stricter legislation. From 2004 to 2012, twenty-two states have 
modified their statutory definitions of independent contractors or transformed penalties for the 
misclassification of employees. While prior articles have analyzed the shortcomings of existing 
independent contractor definitions and enforcement mechanisms, this Article is the first to offer a 
full analysis of the shape and effectiveness of this recent wave of corrective legislation. 
The Article first analyzes these statutes, identifies shared and distinct features, and 
evaluates their strengths and weaknesses. It next examines how these statutes are faring in 
practice in terms of employer attempts to skirt these laws and courts’ responses. Although the 
reforms often improve prior statutes, we identify common flaws revealed during adjudication. To 
avoid liability under stricter misclassification statutes, employers have used tactics such as 
classifying workers as business entities, exploiting subcontracting structures, and simply arguing 
semantic distinctions under the independent contractor tests. 
Finally, the Article uses its analysis of current reforms and enforcement efforts to make 
recommendations for legislatures and courts interested in effectively limiting misclassification. 
Our findings suggest that the most common independent contractor definition, the “ABC” test, 
can successfully combat misclassification and some egregious employer tactics. Its succinct and 
objective demands are most effective when applied uniformly to all workers and universally 
across all employment statutes. However, some employers have still evaded liability under the 
ABC test. We provide model legislative reforms and identify arguments that plaintiffs and 
enforcement agencies can use to prevent employers from exploiting statutory weaknesses. 
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The power of the Internal Revenue Service’s 1099 form for any individual worker is 
vast: when an employer uses a 1099 form to file a payment, it categorizes that worker as an 
“independent contractor” rather than as an “employee”1 and determines whether she is entitled to 
a vast array of legal protections and benefits.2 Employees are shielded by antidiscrimination 
                                                                  
* Lauren Hoff-Downing and Anna Deknatel graduated from the University of Pennsylvania Law School in 2014, where 
they were both Toll Public Interest Scholars. Lauren Hoff-Downing is currently a fellow at Murphy Anderson PLLC, a 
union and employee-side firm.  Anna Deknatel is a law clerk at the Eastern District of New York Bankruptcy Court. 
 Thanks to Professor Sophia Lee for her guidance and feedback in developing and editing this paper. We also 
appreciate the time and input of Sarah Leberstein and Catherine Ruckelshaus.  
1  See Reporting Payments to Independent Contractors, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-
Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Reporting-Payments-to-Independent-Contractors (last updated Dec. 18, 2014) (describing 
the use of form 1099-MISC for reporting payments to independent contractors). 
2  See Drew Hintze, The Misclassification Initiative: Colorado Partners with the United States Department 
of Labor in an Effort to Crackdown on the Misclassification of Employees as Independent Contractors, DULR ONLINE 
(Apr. 23, 2012 4:31 PM), http://www.denverlawreview.org/online-articles/2012/4/23/the-misclassification-initiative-
colorado-partners-with-the.html (explaining that misclassification of employees as independent contractors deprives 
employees of benefits). 
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laws,3 wage and hour laws, and family and medical leave protections; independent contractors are 
not.4 Employees can access federal and state programs, including unemployment insurance and 
workers’ compensation; independent contractors cannot.5 In turn, employers are subject to 
liability and tax and benefit contribution requirements under these laws only for their employees.6 
Thus, by misclassifying workers as independent contractors, employers avoid these 
obligations. The stakes are clear and high. Whether at the local or federal level, reformers have 
consistently identified three harms that result from misclassification. First, misclassified workers 
are deprived of workplace protections and remedies to workplace harms like discrimination and 
wage theft.7 Second, businesses that play by the rules compete with businesses taking unfair 
advantages to their bottom line by skirting taxes.8 And finally, state and local governments and 
their constituents are divested of millions of dollars in lost payments to unemployment insurance 
funds, payroll taxes, and workers’ compensation funds.9 
Still, until recently, many employers regularly flaunted the national and local laws 
governing this consequential distinction, while regulators and agencies generally looked the other 
way: a 2000 Department of Labor study that audited businesses in nine states indicated that 
between ten and thirty percent of employers misclassified at least some portion of their workers.10 
However, state legislators and regulators have since fiercely attacked this rampant culture of 
misclassification. In the last several years, over twenty states have tightened requirements on 
which workers can be deemed independent contractors or have instituted new and stronger 
punishments for those businesses that misclassify.11 Burdens on local government coffers appear 
                                                                  
3  Coverage, U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMP’T COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/coverage.cfm 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2015). 
4  Hintze, supra note 2; Wage and Hour Div., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Employee Misclassification as 
Independent Contractors, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/workers/misclassification/ (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2015). 
5  Hintze, supra note 2; Wage and Hour Div., supra note 4.  
6  See, e.g., Hintze, supra note 2 (explaining that employers who misclassify workers do not pay “federal 
and state unemployment taxes, Social Security and Medicare taxes, and workers’ compensation benefits”); Wage and 
Hour Div., supra note 4 (“Employee misclassification also generates substantial losses to the Treasury and the Social 
Security and Medicare funds, as well as to state unemployment insurance and workers compensation funds.”).  
7  Robert W. Wood, New Age Scrutiny of Employee vs. Contractor Liabilities, 2009 BUSINESS LAW NEWS, 
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, no. 2, at 12, 12 (An employer “must pay [employees] wages, withhold taxes, give them 
employee benefits, be liable for any acts of negligence during their employment, and face the scrutiny of state and federal 
law when it comes to nondiscrimination, discipline, and termination.”). 
8  Olympia Meola, Va. Should Consider Outlawing Misclassifying Workers, JLARC 
Says,TIMESDISPATCH.COM (June 11, 2012, 4:11 PM), http://www2.timesdispatch.com/news/virginia-politics/2012/ 
jun/11/va-should-consider-outlawing-misclassifying-worker-ar-1979801/. “Employers who are correctly categorizing may 
not have a ‘level playing field,’ said JLARC [Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission] project leader Walt 
Smiley.” Id.  
9  Chaz Bolte, Triple Jeopardy: Misclassification Doesn’t Just Cost Workers Wages, It Robs Government of 
Revenue and Local Business of a Chance to Compete, WEPARTYPATRIOTS.COM (Dec. 8, 2011), 
http://wepartypatriots.com/wp/2011/12/08/misclassification-epidemic/. 
10  PLANMATICS, INC., INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS: PREVALENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAMS, at iii (2000), http://wdr.doleta.gov/owsdrr/00-5/00-5.pdf; see also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-717, EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION: IMPROVED COORDINATION, OUTREACH, AND 
TARGETING COULD BETTER ENSURE DETECTION AND PREVENTION 11 (2009), http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/293679.pdf. 
11  See An Act Further Regulating Public Construction in the Commonwealth, 2004 Mass. Legis. Serv. ch. 
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139 (West) (codified as amended in scattered sections of MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. (West 2004)) (effective July 19, 2004); 
Act of April 4, 2005, 2005 N.M. Laws ch. 94, (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-3.1 (West 2005)) (effective June 17, 
2005); An Act Relating to Independent Contractors, 2005 Or. Laws ch. 533 (West) (codified as amended at OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 310.800, 316.162, 670.600, 670.605, 657.040 (West 2006)) (effective Jan. 1, 2006); Act of May 25, 2007, 
2007 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 135 (West) (codified as amended in scattered sections of MINN. STAT. ANN. (West 
2007)); An Act Concerning Penalties for Concealing Employment or Other Information Related to Workers’ 
Compensation Premiums, 2008 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 07-89 (West) (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 31-288, 31-69a, 31-76a (West 2007)); Construction Industry Independent Contractor Act, 2007 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 
ch. 114 (West) (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:20-1 to 34:20-11 (West 2007)) (effective July 13, 2007); Act of July 17, 
2007, 2007 N.H. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 362 (LexisNexis) (codified as amended at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275:4, 275:42, 
275-E:1, 279:1, 281-A:2, 6:12 (2012)) (effective Jan. 1, 2008); Employee Classification Act, 2007 Ill. Laws 26 Legis. 
Serv. ch. 26 (West) (codified at 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/1 to 185/999 (West 2007)) (effective Jan. 1, 2008); Act of 
Mar. 20, 2008, 2008 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 102 (West) (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 50.04.145, 
51.08.070, 51.08.180, 51.08.181, 51.08.195 (West 2008)) (effective June 12, 2008); An Act Concerning Employee 
Misclassification, 2008 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 08-156 (West) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-57h, 31-57i 
(West 2008)) (effective July 1, 2008); An Act Concerning the Misclassification of Employers as Independent Contractors, 
2009 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 406 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-72-114 (2009)) (effective June 2, 2009); Act of 
July 28, 2009, 2009 Or. Laws ch. 845 (West) (codified at OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 670.700, 670.705 (West 2009)) 
(effective July 1, 2009); An Act to Ensure that Construction Workers Are Protected by Workers’ Compensation Insurance, 
2009 Me. Legis. Serv. ch. 452 (West) (codified as amended at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 26, §§ 1302-A, 1312, tit. 39-A, 
§§ 102, 105-A (2009)) (effective Sept. 12, 2009); Workplace Fraud Act of 2009, 2009 Md. Code Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 
ch. 188 (LexisNexis) (codified as amended in scattered sections of MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. (LexisNexis 2009)) 
(effective Oct. 1, 2009); Workplace Fraud Act, 77 Del. Laws ch. 192 (2009) (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 3501-
3514 (West 2009)) (effective Oct. 29, 2009); An Act to Amend the Indiana Code Concerning Labor and Safety, 2009 Ind. 
Legis. Serv. ch. 164 (West) (codified at IND. CODE ANN. §§ 6-8.1-3-21.2, 22-1-1-22, 22-3-1-5, 22-4.1-4-4 (West 2010)) 
(effective Jan. 1, 2010); Act of March 25, 2010, 2010 Ind. Legis. Serv. P.L. 110-2010 (West) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of IND. CODE ANN. (West 2010)) (effective July 1, 2010); An Act Relating to Misclassification of 
Employees to Lower Premiums for Workers’ Compensation and Unemployment Compensation, 2010 Vt. Legis. Serv. ch. 
142 (West) (codified as amended in scattered sections of VT. STAT. ANN. (West 2010)) (effective July 1, 2010); An Act 
To Amend the Laws Governing the Misclassification of Construction Workers, 2010 Me. Legis. Serv. ch. 649 (West) 
(codified as amended at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 105-A (2010)) (effective July 12, 2010); Employee 
Classification Act, 2010 Neb. Laws ch. 563 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-2901 to 48-2912 (LexisNexis 2010)) 
(effective July 15, 2010); An Act Implementing the Recommendations of the Joint Enforcement Commission on 
Employee Misclassification, 2010 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 10-12 (West) (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 31-69a, 31-288 (West 2010)) (effective Oct. 10, 2010); New York State Construction Industry Fair Play Act, 2010 N.Y. 
Sess. Laws ch. 418 (McKinney) (codified at N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 861 to 861-f (McKinney 2010)) (effective Oct. 26, 2010); 
Act of May 12, 2010 2009 Wis. Legis. Serv. ch. 292 (West) (codified at WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 103.005(10), 103.06 (West 
2011)) (effective Jan. 1, 2011); Construction Workplace Misclassification Act, 2010 Pa. Legis. Serv. ch. 72 (West) 
(codified at 43 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 933.1-933.17 (West 2011)) (effective Feb. 10, 2011); Worker Classification 
Coordinated Enforcement Act, 2011 Utah Laws ch. 15 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-47-101 to 34-47-202 
(LexisNexis 2011)) (effective Mar. 7, 2011); Construction Licensees Related Amendments, 2011 Utah Laws ch. 413 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of UTAH CODE ANN. (LexisNexis 2011)) (effective July 1, 2011); Act of May 
12, 2011, 2011 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 81 (codified as amended at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-703, 44-766, 79-3234 (West 
2011)) (effective July 1, 2011); An Act Concerning Independent Contractors in the Trucking and Messenger Courier 
Industries, 2011 Me. Legis. Serv. ch. 176 (West) (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A § 114 (2011)) repealed by An 
Act to Standardize the Definition of “Independent Contractor,” 2012 Me. Legis. ch. 643 (West 2012); Act of Oct. 9, 2011, 
2011 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 706 (West) (codified at CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 226.8, 2753 (West 2012)) (effective Jan. 1, 2012); 
Act of May 2, 2012, 2012 Md. Code Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 206 (LexisNexis) (codified as amended at MD. CODE 
ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 3-903, 3-903.1, 3-905, 3-906, 3-913 (LexisNexis 2012)) (effective July 1, 2012); Act of May 31, 
2012, 2012 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 166 (codified as amended in scattered sections of KAN. STAT. ANN. (West 2012)) 
(effective July 1, 2012); An Act to Standardize the Definition of “Independent Contractor,” 2012 Me. Legis. ch. 643 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol18/iss1/2
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to have ignited this wave of statutory change. The economic recession beginning around 2007 
collapsed state tax revenues and triggered budget gaps in states across the country.12 
Simultaneously, demand for safety net services including unemployment insurance rose steeply, 
driving some state unemployment trust funds to insolvency at exactly the moment states had no 
extra cash flow.13 
The scale of these shortfalls varied by state and was inevitably shaped by each state’s 
size, industries, prior legal standards, and enforcement practices, but the issue has not 
discriminated by region. Around the country, academic and government reports have measured 
the impact of misclassification on state tax revenues or unemployment insurance funds and found 
sizeable deficits.14 For example, Colorado’s labor and employment agency assessed that an 
imposing $167 million in income tax revenue had gone unpaid annually between 2009 and 
2010.15 A policy center focused on Maine’s construction industry estimated its state income tax 
shortfall for the construction industry alone could be as high as $4.3 million per year.16 An 
analysis of 2002 to 2005 audits of the New York Department of Labor’s Unemployment 
Insurance Division revealed an annual average of more than $175 million in underreported taxes 
to the state’s unemployment insurance fund.17 Additionally, a state-funded task force in Maryland 
estimated that the state had lost as much as $20 million in contributions to its trust fund 
annually.18 
States have since set out to collect these lost dollars. Unlike other budget balancing 
tactics, such as tax increases or service reduction, enforcing and strengthening misclassification 
laws appear to have garnered broad political support. Unions have emphasized that reform can 
protect workers and provide access to benefits;19 construction workers were vocal during a 
                                                                  
(West) (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1012, tit. 5, § 19, tit. 26, §§ 591, 591-A, 1043, tit. 39-A, §§ 102, 105-A, 
401 (2012)) (effective Dec. 31, 2012). 
12  See Tracy Gordon, State and Local Budgets and the Great Recession, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Dec. 
2012), http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/12/state-local-budgets-gordon (“Figure 3 shows that these receipts 
fell by roughly $100 billion in real terms from 2007 to 2009.”).  
13  See id. (“Figure 5 shows that caseloads for public programs indeed continued or escalated in the 
downturn. In particular, enrollments climbed for Medicaid, Unemployment Insurance, and higher education from 2007 to 
2009.”); Sarah Leberstein, Nat’l Emp’t Law Project, Independent Contractor Misclassification Imposes Huge Costs on 
Workers and Federal and State Treasuries, Nat’l Emp’t Law Project 3 (updated Aug. 2012), http://nelp.3cdn.net/0693974 
b8e20a9213e_g8m6bhyfx.pdf. 
14  Leberstein, supra note 13. 
15  COLO. DEP’T OF LABOR AND EMP’T, MISCLASSIFICATION OF EMPLOYEES AS INDEPENDENT 
CONTRACTORS, ANNUAL COMPLIANCE REPORT 11 (2011), http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blob 
header=application/pdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1251719071697&ssbinary=true. 
16  FRANÇOISE CARRÉ & RANDALL WILSON, CONSTRUCTION POLICY RESEARCH CENTER, THE SOCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC COSTS OF EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION IN THE MAINE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 2, 10-11 (2005), 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/lwp/Maine%20Misclassification%20Maine.pdf. 
17  LINDA H. DONAHUE, JAMES RYAN LAMARE & FRED B. KOTLER, CORNELL UNIV., THE COST OF 
WORKER MISCLASSIFICATION IN NEW YORK STATE 10 (2007), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent. 
cgi?article=1009&context=reports. 
18  MD. DEP’T OF LABOR, LICENSING AND REGULATION, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JOINT ENFORCEMENT 
TASK FORCE ON WORKPLACE FRAUD 6 (2009), http://www.dllr.state.md.us/workplacefraudtaskforce/wpftfannrep.pdf. 
19  See Teamsters Support Senate Efforts To Protect Workers From Misclassification, Teamsters (June 17, 
2010), http://teamster.org/content/teamsters-support-senate-efforts-protect-workers-misclassification. 
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Vermont legislative campaign,20 and a carpenters union fought for reform in Minnesota and 
Wisconsin.21 
In particular, advocates have successfully prevented mass resistance to these reform 
measures by labeling resistance “job killing” or harmful to business, and by highlighting benefits 
of more effective regulatory schemes to businesses that follow the law. As Ellen Golombek, 
Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment, succinctly explained, 
misclassification “destabilizes the business climate by causing responsible businesses to suffer 
unfair competition.”22 States increasing penalties for violating existing definitions of independent 
contracting have especially seen support from some members of their business community, as the 
costs of stricter enforcement of the legal status quo would only be borne by current rule 
breakers.23 
In some states, prior legal regimes were themselves complex, making compliance costly 
and acting as a barrier to the legitimate use of independent contracting, which can be beneficial to 
both businesses and the people they hire. As one example, Oregon’s legislature was motivated by 
a mobilized business community calling for “an easier to understand and more broadly applied 
law.”24 In states with complex laws, employer backing has also come from emphasizing that 
eliminating “routine practices” is not the aim of reforms, as “[e]mployers legitimately contract 
every day with other independent businesses, typically to perform specialty jobs that the 
contractor performs for a variety of customers.”25 
A dramatic boom of legislating activity around misclassification has occurred across the 
country. Twenty-two states have passed one or more statutes between 2004 and 2012 to alter their 
prior requirements for designating independent contractors or to alter the enforcement structure or 
penalties used against employers who fail to do so correctly.26 Four states, (Washington, 
Massachusetts, New Mexico, and Oregon), began their new focus on misclassification before the 
economic recession in 2007.27 Since then, the wave of statutes has grown every year. In 2007, five 
                                                                  
20  See Press Release, TJ Donovan Receives Support of Vermont Building and Construction Trades Council, 
(June 19, 2012), available at http://vtdigger.org/2012/06/19/tj-donovan-receives-support-of-vermont-building-and-
construction-trades-council/. 
21  See Fight Against Misclassification Fraud Moves Forward in MN, N. COUNTRY CARPENTER, May - Aug. 
2009, at 4, available at http://www.northcountrycarpenter.org/magazines/August%202009%20magazine.pdf (“A series of 
new laws advocated by our union that regulates independent contractors in the construction industry became Minnesota 
law January 1, 2009.”).  
22  Bolte, supra note 9. 
23  See, e.g., STATE OF CONN. JOINT ENFORCEMENT COMM’N ON EMP. MISCLASSIFICATION, ANNUAL 
REPORT 2 (2011), http://www.ctdol.state.ct.us/wgwkstnd/JEC/JEC.pdf (noting Connecticut increased penalties for 
misclassification after receiving “substantial feedback from the business community that existing penalties were 
insufficient”). 
24  Jim Bruson, Oregon Changes the Definition of “Independent Contractor,” CONSTRUCTION 
CONTRACTORS BULL. BOARD, 7 (Oct. 2005), http://www.oregon.gov/CCB/Documents/pdf/Oct05.pdf. 
25  Leveling the Playing Field: Protecting Workers and Businesses Affected by Misclassification: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 111th Cong. 2 (2010) (statement of Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, 
Legal Co-Director, National Employment Law Project), available at http://www.help.senate.gov/imo 
/media/doc/Ruckelshaus.pdf.  
26  See supra note 11. 
27  See An Act Relating to Employment, 1991Wash Legis. Serv. ch. 246 (West) (amending WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 50.04.140 (West 2014)) (effective Jan. 1, 1992); An Act Further Regulating Public Construction in the 
Commonwealth, 2004 Mass. Legis. Serv. ch. 139 (West) (codified as amended in scattered sections of MASS. GEN. LAWS 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol18/iss1/2
ABC ON THE BOOKS FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/15  3:14 PM 
2015] ABC ON THE BOOKS AND IN THE COURTS 59 
states set misclassification legislation into effect;28 in 2008, two more joined;29 in 2009, six states 
passed laws relevant to independent contracting and misclassification;30 in 2010 eight states 
legislated on the issue;31 five additional legislative changes came online in 2011;32 and 2012 saw 
                                                                  
ANN. (West 2004)) (effective July 19, 2004); Act of April 4, 2005, 2005 N.M. Laws ch. 94, (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 60-13-3.1 (West 2005)) (effective June 17, 2005); An Act Relating to Independent Contractors, 2005 Or. Laws ch. 533 
(West) (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 310.800, 316.162, 670.600, 670.605, 657.040 (West 2006)) 
(effective Jan. 1, 2006). 
28  See Act of May 25, 2007, 2007 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 135 (West) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of MINN. STAT. ANN. (West 2007)); An Act Concerning Penalties for Concealing Employment or Other 
Information Related to Workers’ Compensation Premiums, 2008 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 07-89 (West) (codified as 
amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-288, 31-69a, 31-76a (West 2007)); Construction Industry Independent 
Contractor Act, 2007 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 114 (West) (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:20-1 to 34:20-11 (West 
2007)) (effective July 13, 2007); Act of July 17, 2007, 2007 N.H. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 362 (LexisNexis) (codified as 
amended at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275:4, 275:42, 275-E:1, 279:1, 281-A:2, 6:12 (2012)) (effective Jan. 1, 2008); 
Employee Classification Act, 2007 Ill. Laws 26 Legis. Serv. ch. 26 (West) (codified at 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/1 
to 185/999 (West 2007)) (effective Jan. 1, 2008). 
29  See Act of Mar. 20, 2008, 2008 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 102 (West) (codified as amended at WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. §§ 50.04.145, 51.08.070, 51.08.180, 51.08.181, 51.08.195 (West 2008)) (effective June 12, 2008); An Act 
Concerning Employee Misclassification, 2008 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 08-156 (West) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 31-57h, 31-57i (West 2008)) (effective July 1, 2008). 
30  See An Act Concerning the Misclassification of Employers as Independent Contractors, 2009 Colo. Sess. 
Laws ch. 406 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-72-114 (2009)) (effective June 2, 2009); Act of July 28, 2009, 2009 
Or. Laws ch. 845 (West) (codified at OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 670.700, 670.705 (West 2009)) (effective July 1, 2009); An 
Act to Ensure that Construction Workers Are Protected by Workers’ Compensation Insurance, 2009 Me. Legis. Serv. ch. 
452 (West) (codified as amended at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 26, §§ 1302-A, 1312, tit. 39-A, §§ 102, 105-A (2009)) 
(effective Sept. 12, 2009); Workplace Fraud Act of 2009, 2009 Md. Code Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 188 (LexisNexis) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. (LexisNexis 2009)) (effective Oct. 1, 2009); 
Workplace Fraud Act, 77 Del. Laws ch. 192 (2009) (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 3501-3514 (West 2009)) 
(effective Oct. 29, 2009); An Act to Amend the Indiana Code Concerning Labor and Safety, 2009 Ind. Legis. Serv. ch. 164 
(West) (codified at IND. CODE ANN. §§ 6-8.1-3-21.2, 22-1-1-22, 22-3-1-5, 22-4.1-4-4 (West 2010)) (effective Jan. 1, 
2010). 
31  See Act of March 25, 2010, 2010 Ind. Legis. Serv. P.L. 110-2010 (West) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of IND. CODE ANN. (West 2010)) (effective July 1, 2010); An Act Relating to Misclassification of 
Employees to Lower Premiums for Workers’ Compensation and Unemployment Compensation, 2010 Vt. Legis. Serv. ch. 
142 (West) (codified as amended in scattered sections of VT. STAT. ANN. (West 2010)) (effective July 1, 2010); An Act 
To Amend the Laws Governing the Misclassification of Construction Workers, 2010 Me. Legis. Serv. ch. 649 (West) 
(codified as amended at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 105-A (2010)) (effective July 12, 2010); Employee 
Classification Act, 2010 Neb. Laws ch. 563 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-2901 to 48-2912 (LexisNexis 2010)) 
(effective July 15, 2010); An Act Implementing the Recommendations of the Joint Enforcement Commission on 
Employee Misclassification, 2010 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 10-12 (West) (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 31-69a, 31-288 (West 2010)) (effective Oct. 10, 2010); New York State Construction Industry Fair Play Act, 2010 N.Y. 
Sess. Laws ch. 418 (McKinney) (codified at N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 861 to 861-f (McKinney 2010)) (effective Oct. 26, 2010); 
Act of May 12, 2010 2009 Wis. Legis. Serv. ch. 292 (West) (codified at WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 103.005(10), 103.06 (West 
2011)) (effective Jan. 1, 2011); Construction Workplace Misclassification Act, 2010 Pa. Legis. Serv. ch. 72 (West) 
(codified at 43 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 933.1-933.17 (West 2011)) (effective Feb. 10, 2011). 
32  See Worker Classification Coordinated Enforcement Act, 2011 Utah Laws ch. 15 (codified at UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 34-47-101 to 34-47-202 (LexisNexis 2011)) (effective Mar. 7, 2011); Construction Licensees Related 
Amendments, 2011 Utah Laws ch. 413 (codified as amended in scattered sections of UTAH CODE ANN. (LexisNexis 
2011)) (effective July 1, 2011); Act of May 12, 2011, 2011 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 81 (codified as amended at KAN. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 44-703, 44-766, 79-3234 (West 2011)) (effective July 1, 2011); An Act Concerning Independent Contractors in 
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three states take legislative action.33 
This Article seeks to provide an analysis of this quickly changing legal landscape by 
closely examining the array of new statutes as well as the case law applying them. While previous 
articles have discussed widespread misclassification, few articles have examined the effectiveness 
of the legislative solutions currently being implemented. Recent scholarship has largely focused 
on critiquing the traditional common law independent contractor analysis and on suggesting 
improvements.34 That traditional test uses many non-dispositive factors to assess the control an 
employer has over a worker.35 It has been criticized for being easily manipulated by employers 
and for generating uncertainty over a worker’s employee status.36 Scholars have also focused on 
legislative adaptations to the independent contractor test, proposing reformulations of the test, or 
alternative legislative solutions to increase liability for misclassification.37 Other scholars have 
suggested innovative common law causes of action to protect workers against misclassification, 
and to allow them to obtain redress when misclassification occurs.38 
A handful of articles have discussed the recent wave of legislation modifying the 
independent contractor definition or penalties for misclassification, but they have either only 
provided a preliminary description of the different statutory models,39 or focused solely on a 
particular subset of statutes.40 This Article expands on these analyses, providing an inventory of 
                                                                  
the Trucking and Messenger Courier Industries, 2011 Me. Legis. Serv. ch. 176 (West) (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 39-A § 114 (2011)) repealed by An Act to Standardize the Definition of “Independent Contractor,” 2012 Me. Legis. 
ch. 643 (West 2012); Act of Oct. 9, 2011, 2011 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 706 (West) (codified at CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 226.8, 
2753 (West 2012)) (effective Jan. 1, 2012). 
33  See Act of May 2, 2012, 2012 Md. Code Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 206 (LexisNexis) (codified as 
amended at MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 3-903, 3-903.1, 3-905, 3-906, 3-913 (LexisNexis 2012)) (effective July 1, 
2012); Act of May 31, 2012, 2012 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 166 (West) (codified as amended in scattered sections of KAN. 
STAT. ANN. (West 2012)) (effective July 1, 2012); An Act to Standardize the Definition of “Independent Contractor,” 
2012 Me. Legis. ch. 643 (West) (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1012, tit. 5, § 19, tit. 26, §§ 591, 591-A, 1043, 
tit. 39-A, §§ 102, 105-A, 401 (West 2012)) (effective Dec. 31, 2012).  
34  See Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical 
Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 418-21 (2002) (critiquing the common law test); See generally Richard R. Carlson, Why 
the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
295, 306-52 (2001) (providing a comprehensive analysis of the development of the common law control test, economic 
realities test, and exploring the problems with both tests). 
35  See Carlson, supra note 34, at 298-99. 
36  Befort, supra note 34, at 418-21; Carlson, supra note 34, at 335-36. 
37  Carlson, supra note 34, at 301 (proposing a test that focuses on transactions between parties, rather than 
employee status); Karen R. Harned et al., Creating a Workable Legal Standard for Defining an Independent Contractor, 4 
J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 93, 95, 113 (2010) (arguing for a one factor legal “step back” test, that would reduce 
uncertainty for businesses and the government); Jenna Amato Moran, Independent Contractor or Employee? 
Misclassification of Workers and Its Effect on the State, 28 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 105, 129-30 (2010) (suggesting a third 
category of workers, “dependent contractors,” who would enjoy some of the same benefits as employees).  
38  See, e.g., Jean Tom, Note, Is A Newscarrier an Employee or an Independent Contractor? Deterring 
Abuse of the “Independent Contractor” Label Via State Tort Claims, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 489, 501-02 (2001) 
(proposing that the use of state tort claims of fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation could be a powerful tool to hold 
employers liable for misclassification of employees). 
39  See, e.g., Jason M. Goldstein, Money under the Bridge: The Worker Misclassification Problem, 5 FLA. A 
& M U. L. REV. 107, 125-29 (2009) (providing a brief overview of state legislation addressing independent contractor 
misclassification). 
40  See, e.g., Christopher Buscaglia, Crafting a Legislative Solution to the Economic Harm of Employee 
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misclassification legislation recently passed or amended in twenty-two states, including statutes 
passed since previous articles were written. In Part I of this Article, we appraise the federal 
context during which this state legislative action has occurred. In Part II, we provide a statutory 
analysis of recent misclassification legislation, including an investigation of the most effective 
features and the apparent weaknesses. Our analysis evaluates, in greater detail than prior articles, 
specific statutory features and language, considering both alterations to independent contractor 
definitions and strengthened penalties for misclassification. 
In Part III, this Article provides an analysis of how these statutes have fared in practice, 
through an analysis of case law under the new statutes, an additional step beyond previous 
scholarly work that has focused on statutory language. In particular, we focus on limitations that 
still exist under current statutory schemes, as well as common arguments employers have made to 
avoid liability. Throughout our analysis of employer and court responses, we also suggest ways to 
strengthen statutes and to use common law arguments to prevent the current statutory weaknesses 
from being exploited by employers. 
We believe that objective and predictable definitions benefit most workers. Prior 
complex legal regimes have made compliance challenging for even well-intentioned businesses, 
beyond employers deliberately taking advantage of weak or unenforced misclassification laws or 
those succumbing to the economic pressure of widespread industry practices.41 Our comparison of 
the variety of statutory models underscores that efficacy will likely vary, including by the clarity 
of reformed laws and the strength of incentives provided by the new laws. Future legislative 
efforts should replicate penalty statutes and the codification of a presumption of employee status 
with a simplified exception for independent contractors, frequently called the “ABC” test. 
Early adjudications under the new statutes also show that some employers are seeking 
alternative business models or are finding new strategies to avoid liability for misclassifying their 
workers. Distinct from prior employer practices, these tactics—such as companies simply 
disappearing or crafting creative legal arguments to dodge accountability—may allow employers 
to find safe havens where they are more fully insulated from the reach of the law. Employee 
plaintiffs may be best served not only by strengthening statutes to close off these loopholes, but 
also by using common law arguments to prevent employers from successfully exploiting such 
loopholes. 
 
I. FEDERAL CONTEXT AND COORDINATION WITH STATES’  
MISCLASSIFICATION CRACKDOWNS 
A worker’s status, as an independent contractor or employee, determines his eligibility 
for federal payroll taxes as well as for Social Security, Medicare, and federal worker protections, 
such as those under the Fair Labor Standards Act.42 While states currently appear to have taken 
the lead in fighting employee misclassification, national attention on misclassification has grown 
as concerns have mounted over both losses to federal tax collection and employers escaping the 
                                                                  
Misclassification, 9 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 111, 120-26 (2009) (analyzing in detail five recent statutes that directly penalize 
for misclassification and discussing the consequences for states without such statutes). 
41  See Mark Wiletsky, Worker Misclassification Poses Serious Risks for Businesses, COLORADOBIZ 
MAGAZINE, Dec. 2010. 
42  See Hintze, supra note 2. 
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reach of federal regulatory worker protections.43 Relative to the entire national workforce, the 
scale of independent contracting is not vast: in 2005, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported there 
were 10.3 million independent contractors nationally, comprising 7.4% percent of the 
workforce.44 Nonetheless, according to Congressman Richard Neal, the Government 
Accountability Office estimates that worker misclassification costs the federal treasury $4.7 
billion annually in income tax revenues.45 
Simultaneous to local misclassification legislating and enforcement, federal enforcement 
has expanded, led primarily by the Department of Labor (DOL) and the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS). In 2007, the IRS delivered a bill to FedEx for $319 million in back taxes and interest, 
asserting that a 2002 audit indicated the company had misclassified its more than 13,000 drivers 
as independent contractors.46 While FedEx initially won a reversal,47 the Ninth Circuit recently 
held that a class of FedEx drivers were employees and had been misclassified as independent 
contractors.48 More influential than any ultimate tab to the federal government, the FedEx case 
successfully signaled the IRS’s seriousness about identifying employee misclassification and 
enforcing compliance. Recent years have seen similar efforts by the DOL’s Wage and Hour 
Division: in 2010, the agency collected almost four million dollars in back wages for minimum 
wage and overtime violations from misclassification investigations, an almost four hundred 
percent increase over the $1.3 million the division collected in 2008.49 In 2010, President 
Obama’s federal budget anticipated the inclusion of “at least $7 billion over 10 years,” yielded 
from misclassification crackdowns by various agencies.50 
The IRS has also steered the national response to misclassification away from 
punishments for violations and towards incentives for compliance. In September 2011, it 
announced the Voluntary Classification Settlement Program, which encourages employers to 
voluntarily reclassify as employees workers whom they have treated as independent contractors 
for three years.51 The employers cannot escape all federal payroll tax liability, but “can obtain 
substantial relief” via a reduced obligation of about one percent of a year’s wages for the 
                                                                  
43  Steven Greenhouse, U.S. Cracks Down on ‘Contractors’ as a Tax Dodge, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/18/business/18workers.html. 
44  Economic News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Contingent and Alternative 
Employment Arrangements, February 2005, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, (July 27, 2005), 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/conemp.nr0.htm. 
45  Effects of Misclassifying Workers as Independent Contractors: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on 
Income Sec. & Family Support and Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the Comm. on Ways & Means, 110th Cong. 
(2007) (statement of Richard E. Neal, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures). 
46  Todd D. Saveland, FedEx’s New “Employees”: Their Disgruntled Independent Contractors, 36 TRANSP. 
L.J. 95, 115 (2009). 
47  Wayne Risher, IRS Reverses Assessment over Status of FedEx Drivers, Com. Appeal (Oct. 23, 2008, 9:49 
AM), http://www.commercialappeal.com/business/government-bolsters-fedex-claims-about-its-drivers. 
48  See Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 997 (9th Cir. 2014). 
49  See Joshua Kirkpatrick & Stephanie Hankin, Colorado Latest to Join U.S. DOL to Reduce Worker 
Misclassification, LITTLER (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/colorado-latest-join-us-
dol-reduce-worker-misclassification. 
50  Greenhouse, supra note 43. 
51  IRS Announces New Voluntary Worker Classification Settlement Program; Past Payroll Tax Relief 
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reclassified workers, without any interest or penalties.52 The program focuses on the need to 
“‘provide certainty and relief to employers’” by allowing them to resolve classification issues “at 
a low cost” to “‘give [employers] a fresh start with their tax obligations.’”53 However, this 
incentive may be diminished, as the IRS cannot offer to wipe away back payments, penalties, or 
interest to other federal or state agencies, a weakness emphasized by the program’s critics.54 
To fortify and streamline federal investigations, in September 2011 the IRS and DOL 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to enable information sharing and coordination, 
citing the need to “level the playing field for law-abiding employers and ensure that employees 
receive the protections to which they are entitled.”55 The DOL’s Wage and Hour Division has also 
signed similar MOUs to facilitate information sharing with their counterpart agencies in more 
than a dozen states.56 Arguably, these agreements not only improve federal investigatory efforts 
but also provide a multiplier effect for the consequences of state enforcements, which can now 
directly lead to federal tax liabilities, enlarging the incentives against misclassification. 
Still, federal activity remains entirely limited to these enforcement tactics, though 
multiple bills related to misclassification have been introduced in Congress. As a senator, 
President Obama advocated for federal legislation on the topic.57 President Obama’s White House 
has expressed support for at least three bills,58 perhaps indicating an opportunity for passage given 
recent focus on federal deficits and on closing tax loopholes. While all three proposals include 
increased misclassification penalties, their forms otherwise vary. The Taxpayer Responsibility, 
Accountability, and Consistency Act of 2009 would empower independent contractors to petition 
the IRS for a determination about their status, while also shifting the burden to employers to 
demonstrate their reasonable basis for classifying workers as independent contractors.59 
Provisions of the Fair Playing Field Act, introduced in both 2010 and 2012, include removing the 
legal safe harbor against IRS prosecution of employers who consistently treat workers as 
independent contractors and provide a reasonable basis for doing so to the IRS.60 The act would 
                                                                  
52  Id. Other program requirements include an application sixty days before the desired reclassification date. 
Id. While employers will not be audited on payroll taxes for prior years related to such workers, any employer already 
being audited by the IRS, DOL, or a state agency pertaining to worker classification is ineligible. Id. 
53  Id. (quoting IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman). 
54  John Browning, The IRS Gets Tough on Employers, D CEO MAGAZINE, May-June, 2012, available at 
http://www.dmagazine.com/publications/d-ceo/2012/may-june/the-irs-gets-tough-on-employers. 
55  News Release, Labor Secretary, IRS Commissioner Sign Memorandum of Understanding to Improve 
Agencies’ Coordination on Employee Misclassification Compliance and Education, DEP’T OF LABOR (Sept. 19, 2011), 
http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/whd/WHD20111373.htm. 
56  See Misclassification of Employees as Independent Contractors, Dep’t of Labor, 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/workers/misclassification/stateinfo-nojs.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2015). The states whose 
agencies have signed MOUs are: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Utah, and Washington. Id. 
57  See Robert Wood, White House on Contractor vs. Employee: There Will Be Blood, FORBES, (Sept. 17, 
2010, 7:00AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2010/09/17/white-house-on-contractor-vs-employee-there-will-
be-blood/. 
58  See id. 
59  Bill Would Clarify Independent Contractor Rules, LITTLER (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.littler.com/dc-
employment-law-update/bill-would-clarify-independent-contractor-rules-increase-employer-penalties. 
60  Fair Playing Field Act of 2012: Congress Trying Again to End ‘Safe Harbor’ for Businesses that May 
Have Misclassified Employees as Independent Contractors, PEPPER HAMILTON (March 5, 2012), 
http://www.pepperlaw.com/publications_update.aspx?articlekey=2314. 
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also create a “Miranda warning for independent contractors,” by requiring written disclosure 
about federal tax obligations and the provision of information about employment and labor 
issues.61 Finally, the 2011 Employee Misclassification Prevention Act would amend the Fair 
Labor Standards Act to demand direct notice to workers about their classification status and right 
to challenge that classification, and impose recordkeeping requirements.62 
II. ANALYSIS OF RECENT STATE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTING LEGISLATION 
Legislative action limiting the use of and penalizing the abuse of independent contractor 
status for workers has been as varied as states themselves. Each state has tailored its strategy to 
the distinct state statutory baseline governing local independent contracting. Some states have 
chosen to directly modify the legal requirements for a business to validly use independent 
contractors. Such a redefinition strategy has taken multiple forms. In some instances, states have 
revised the definitions of independent contracting relevant to singular employee benefits, such as 
workers compensation or unemployment insurance, either to bring that definition in line with 
others or to test a more rigorous standard. Other states have more ambitiously transformed their 
misclassification status quo by setting a universally applicable independent contracting standard 
across agencies and employer obligations. 
Some states have instead increased enforcement of existing laws, through amplified 
investigative efforts, or strengthened penalties for businesses caught misclassifying employees. 
Multiple states have accomplished this strategy without direct legislative change, via the use of 
task forces that coordinate enforcement resources and information across various state agencies. 
In a subset of states focused on increasing compliance through stronger penalties, statutes have 
altered liability standards, including the introduction of criminal penalties for misclassification. 
Definitional and enforcement strategies have been implemented both independently and in 
tandem. 
In addition, a group of states has enacted legislation targeting a single industry, almost 
solely the local construction industry, seen as the hub of the most egregious and pervasive 
misclassification practices. These statutes have tended to be more comprehensive than the 
universally applicable statutes and have often combined altered definitions with increased 
penalties and enforcement strategies. 
A. “Definitional” Statutes 
Sixteen states—a majority of those that have recently addressed misclassification 
through legislation—have altered their statutory definitions of independent contracting or 
employment relationships.63 In many ways, these definitions are at the heart of the matter. 
                                                                  
61  Wood, supra note 57. 
62  See Kirkpatrick & Hankin, supra note 49. 
63  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3501 (West 2014); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/10; (West 2014); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 44-703 (West 2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 102(13-A) (2014); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. 
§ 3-903 (LexisNexis 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148B (West 2014); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.723 (West 
2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-2903 (LexisNexis 2014) (referencing NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-604(5)(a) 
(LexisNexis 2014)); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:4 (2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-4 (West 2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 60-13-3.1 (West 2014); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-c (McKinney 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.600 (West 2014); 43 PA. 
STAT. ANN. § 933.3 (West 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-103 (LexisNexis 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 50.04.140 (West 2014). 
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Without clear communication of which workers are and are not independent contractors, 
businesses struggle to comply with the law when attempting to legitimately use independent 
contractors, workers are less likely to be aware of misclassification or to pursue a remedy, and 
state agencies must expend resources to implement increased penalties and strengthen 
enforcement mechanisms.64 All of these complications enable businesses to succeed at 
deliberately misclassifying workers. 
States have variously simplified their independent contractor definitions, refocused on 
new indicia of independence, and standardized definitions across a variety of relevant benefits and 
employer obligations. Across the nation, many states include contrasting definitions within 
distinct areas of their statutory systems, such as those governing claims and benefits, taxes, 
unemployment insurance, or workers compensation. Thus, legislatively shifting the definition of 
an independent contractor to prevent misclassification requires more than merely identifying the 
clearest or fairest test. Instead, it is a matter of unifying and simplifying the standard: both the test 
itself and its consistent application across relevant laws. 
1. The Three-Prong ABC Test and Its Reach 
In 2004, Massachusetts made its most recent alteration to its statutory definition of 
independent contracting, a simplified version of the common law “right to control” factors with a 
presumption of employment surmountable only by satisfying a three-prong assessment commonly 
referred to as the “ABC” test. The three factors as laid out in the Massachusetts and other state 
statutes are: (A) that “the individual is free from direction and control,” applicable both “under his 
contract for the performance of service and in fact,” (B) that “the service is performed outside the 
usual course of business of the employer,” and (C) that the “individual is customarily engaged in 
an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business of the same nature as that 
involved in the service performed.”65 Massachusetts did not create the ABC test,66 but, as 
discussed in depth below, the ABC formulation and variations on it has come to dominate reform 
of independent contracting definition laws in other states.67 It is of note that this Part examines 
only recent statutory changes; other states already have ABC tests and similar definitional 
constructions in all or some of their relevant statutes, but an analysis of the full use of the ABC 
test across the country is outside the scope of this Article. 
In contrast to the ABC formulation, many states’ common law, the IRS, and some state 
statutes use tests that identify a legitimate independent contractor by functionally analyzing the 
ability of the employer (or “payer”) to “control or direct only the result of the work and not what 
will be done and how it will be done.”68 Despite this shared theme, independent contracting 
definitions have instead traditionally provided factors for consideration. 
Since 1987, the IRS has considered twenty or more factors, to identify the existence of 
                                                                  
64  See Wiletsky, supra note 41. 
65  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148B(a)(1)-(3) (West 2014). 
66  See, e.g., R. Stell, Independent Contractors and ABC Test Reform in Maine, NAT’L FED’N OF INDEP. 
BUS. (Mar. 31, 2006), http://www.nfib.com/nfib-in-my-state/nfib-in-my-state-content?cmsid=27943 (indicating that 
Maine adopted the ABC test in 1935). 
67  See, e.g., R. Stell, Independent Contractors and ABC Test Reform in Maine, NAT’L FED’N OF INDEP. 
BUS. (Mar. 31, 2006), http://www.nfib.com/nfib-in-my-state/nfib-in-my-state-content?cmsid=27943. 
68  Independent Contractor Defined, IRS (last updated Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-
Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Independent-Contractor-Defined. 
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an employer- employee relationship; the list was derived from the common law “right to control” 
tests and so provides a helpful summary.69 The factors are organized into three categories: 
“behavioral control,” “financial control,” and “type of relationship,” and no factor is given 
specific weight or treated as dispositive.70 The behavioral control categories are: (1) instruction 
type, (2) degree of instruction, (3) evaluation systems and (4) training of the worker.71 To evaluate 
financial control, the IRS considers the ability of the business to “control the economic aspects of 
worker’s job,” considering: (5) significant investment, (6) unreimbursed expenses, (7) opportunity 
for profit or loss, (8) services available to the market or other businesses, and (9) the method of 
payment.72 Finally, in considering how the parties themselves “perceive their relationship to each 
other,” the IRS examines the presence or absence of (10) written contracts, (11) employee 
benefits, (12) permanency of the relationship, and (13) “[s]ervices provided as key activity of the 
business.”73 Common law “right to control” tests implement similar non-dispositive factors 
regarding the control or direction of the means of work.74 
In the eight years from 2004 to 2012, sixteen states—including Maine twice, once 
regarding its trucking and courier industries75 and once regarding its unemployment compensation 
statute76—have transformed the legal requirements to be an independent contractor.77 All of these 
states except two have implemented ABC tests or related formulations. Specifically, Kansas and 
Maine chose definitions that use sets of factors resembling common law control tests.78 Some of 
                                                                  
69  JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO WORKER CLASSIFICATION 
FOR FEDERAL TAX PURPOSES, JCX-26-07 2-5 (2007) available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/x-26-07.pdf. 
70  See Topic 762—Independent Contractor vs. Employee, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc762.html (last 
updated July 16, 2014); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 69 at 5.  
71  Behavioral Control, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-
Employed/Behavioral-Control (last updated July 14, 2014). 
72  Financial Control, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Financial-
Control (last updated July 14, 2014). 
73  Type of Relationship, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Type-of-
Relationship (last updated Aug. 28, 2014). 
74  See Topic 762—Independent Contractor vs. Employee, supra note 70. Common law “right to control” 
tests include factors such as: the nature and degree of control or instruction, whether a distinction exists between business 
or occupation of a worker and an employee, whether work is done with supervision, the amount of skill required, the 
amount of tools or materials the worker provides and if work site is provided by employer, the permanency of the 
relationship, the method of payment (based on time or by project), the extent to which the services rendered are integral or 
needed or part of regular business, the intent of involved parties as to the character of the relationship; and whether the 
worker may be employed by more than one firm or employer. See Independent Contractor (Self-Employed or Employee?, 
IRS (last updated Oct. 2, 2014) http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Independent-
Contractor-Self-Employed-or-Employee. 
75  An Act Concerning Independent Contractors in the Trucking and Messenger Courier Industries, 2011 
Me. Legis. Serv. ch. 176 (West) (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 114 (2011)), repealed by An Act to 
Standardize the Definition of “Independent Contractor,” 2012 Me. Legis. ch. 643 (West 2012). 
76  An Act to Standardize the Definition of “Independent Contractor,” 2012 Me. Legis. ch. 643 (West) 
(codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1012, tit. 5, § 19, tit. 26, §§ 591, 591-A, 1043, tit. 39-A, §§ 102, 105-A, 401 
(West 2012)) (effective Dec. 31, 2012). 
77  See supra note 63. 
78  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-703(i)(3)(D) (West 2014) (codifying a “right to control” test); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 102(13-A) (2014) (codifying a presumption of employee status with several required factors to 
overcome that status); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1043(11)(E) (2014) (codifying a free from control factor test with 
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these changes apply to only a portion of the state’s statutory scheme, either specific benefits or 
certain industries or workers, as will be discussed in further detail below. The ABC test, coupled 
with a presumption of employee status unless the employer demonstrates compliance, has been 
the clearly favored test of state legislatures; most of these states adopted a clear or recognizable 
ABC formulation.79 In contrast, some states have made notable variations in the phrasing of the 
ABC test. For example, three states, Pennsylvania, New Mexico, and Oregon, established a 
hybrid definition, replacing the “B” or “usual course of business” prong with either additional 
factors or requirements to satisfy “C,” “customarily engaging in an independently established 
trade.”80 And, irrespective of the use of ABC or another formulation, all sixteen states’ statutes, 
except for Kansas’s and Maine’s unemployment compensation statutes, either explicitly or 
implicitly made employee status the presumption by utilizing a list of mandatory criteria rather 
than a set of subjectively weighted factors.81 
2. Variations on the ABC Language and Structure 
Despite the domination of the ABC formulation, states have made small and large 
modifications to the language of each prong, which merit closer analysis to identify disadvantages 
and worthy improvements. Worker advocates have called ABC the “most objective” test and “the 
most difficult for employers to manipulate.”82 Still, one academic, Professor Buscaglia, 
                                                                  
five mandatory factors and seven additional criteria, three of which must be satisfied). 
79  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 3501(a)(7), 3503(c) (West 2014) (using the ABC formula without 
alteration with an implicit presumption); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-903(c)(1) (LexisNexis 2014) (using altered 
ABC factors, such as showing the freedom from direction and control both under contract and in fact, with an explicit 
presumption of employee status).  
80  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-3.1(A) (West 2014) (establishing additional factors including that “the person 
providing labor or services is responsible for obtaining business registrations or licenses required by state law[,] . . . 
furnishes the tools or equipment necessary to provide the labor or services[,] . . . has the authority to hire and fire 
employees to perform the labor or services,” and that payment “is made upon completion of the performance of specific 
portions of a project or is made on the basis of a periodic retainer,” and listing circumstances that must be met to satisfy 
what is commonly known as the C prong, that a worker is engaged in an independently established business.); 43 PA. 
STAT. ANN. § 933.3 (West 2014) (requiring a written contract; in place of the “C” prong to show independently 
established trade, six factors are required: possesses tools; ability to realize profit or suffer losses from services; 
proprietary interest in a business; maintenance of separate business location; previously performed or held out as available 
to perform similar services; maintains liability insurance); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.600(3)(a-e) (West 2014) (lacking a 
“B” prong; its “C” prong mandates three of five factors to show an independently established trade: a separate location; 
bearing risk of loss; at least two clients that year, or an attempt to obtain such clients; a significant investment; and the 
authority to hire and fire).  
81  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1043(11)(E) (2014) (including a list of optional criteria); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 44-703(i)(3)(D) (West 2014) (specifying a right to control test). Statutes with explicit presumptions include: 820 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/10; (West 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148B (West 2014); MD. CODE ANN., 
LAB. & EMPL. § 3-903 (LexisNexis 2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-2903 (LexisNexis 2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 275:4 (2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-4 (West 2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-3.1 (West 2014); N.Y. LAB. LAW 
§ 861-c (McKinney 2014); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.3 (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.04.100 (West 2014). 
Statutes with implicit presumptions from mandatory criteria include: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3501 (West 2014); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 181.723 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.600 (West 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-103 
(LexisNexis 2014).  
82  CATHERINE K. RUCKELSHAUS & SARAH LEBERSTEIN, NELP SUMMARY OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR 
REFORMS 5 (2011), available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/Justice/2011/2011IndependentContractorReformUpdate.pdf. 
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complained that the ABC factors are only deceptively simple and in application are “neither 
clearer nor easier” than the common law right to control factors that they typically replace.83 He 
argued that in application, the prongs’ broad language requires analysis too similar to common 
law tests; in particular, he focused on the “A” prong and claimed it incorporates common law 
right to control analysis by requiring courts to “weigh several factors to determine if the employer 
exercises sufficient control over the work.”84 
The “A” prong does focus—similarly to the common law test—on the relationship 
between the parties and the presence of control. Yet, while common law tests may look beyond 
the language of the contract or may require courts to consider the practical relationship when a 
contract is absent, Massachusetts’s statute explicitly mandates that freedom from direction and 
control be demonstrated contractually and in fact, 85 thus amplifying the prong’s demand with a 
patently objective, although perhaps malleable, requirement. Four other states, Washington, New 
York, Nebraska, and Maryland, have adopted the “A” prong with the language that requires proof 
of both contractual language and the employment relationship in fact.86 In New York, this 
mechanism’s power has become apparent in decisions by the state’s Workers’ Compensation 
Board under the new law. In one decision, the absence of a contract trumped evidence that a 
subcontractor acted free from the control of the prime contractor, by paying its worker who also 
knew nothing of the prime contractor.87 Similarly, in another decision regarding a subcontractor 
without a written contract with its prime contractor, the board indicated the subcontractor’s 
payment responsibilities and actions as a foreman over other workers were simply undertaken “in 
addition to” other tasks and “did not endow the claimant with the independent authority” to 
overcome an absent written contract.88 
Every other state newly utilizing the “A” factor, whether within a full ABC framework 
or incorporated into a broader test, has left it to employers, employees, and ultimately to the 
discretion of courts to assess the absence or presence of freedom from control.89 Even where the 
contractual demand is present, these statutes provide no guidance for interpreting a lack of control 
in fact. As with common law tests, along with the presence of a proper written agreement for 
independent contracting, the “A” factor still requires evidence that, in practice, the employer has 
not exerted control. Nebraska’s statute is unique in asserting that all its ABC factors are not 
intended to be interpreted through common law formulations and “shall be considered completed 
as written,”90 perhaps attempting to prevent its statutory reform from being rendered irrelevant by 
the continued use of common law standards. In contrast, this emphasis on the role of contractual 
                                                                  
83  Buscaglia, supra note 40, at 129. Professor Buscaglia refers to the ABC test as the “3-prong test.” See id. 
at 124, 129. 
84  Id. at 129. 
85  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148B(a)(1) (West 2014). 
86  See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 50.04.140(1)(a), 50.04.145(1), 51.08.181(1), 51.08.195(1) (West 2014); 
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-c(1)(a) to (c) (McKinney 2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-2903 (LexisNexis 2014) (referencing 
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-604(5)(a) (LexisNexis 2014)); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-903 (Lexis 2014). 
87  Rustuccia Drywall Inc., No. 3060 9427, 2011 WL 2661233, at *1, *3 (N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Bd. June 
29, 2011). 
88  William A[.] Teague Restorations, No. G000 4014, 2012 WL 106363, at *6 (N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Bd. 
Jan. 6 2012) While stare decisis prevented the Board from applying New York’s statutory test, the common law test 
reached the same result. See id. at *4-6. 
89  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3501 (West 2014). 
90  NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-604(5) (LexisNexis 2014). 
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language may provide employers with an opening to contractually designate a worker as an 
independent contractor, while in reality preserving employee-like control. Still, while the ABC 
factors may simplify and clarify the process of drawing lines between independent contracting 
and employment, even they cannot remove the complexity inherent in business and labor 
structures nor the inevitability of courts applying the tests and reaching differing conclusions 
under the same facts. 
Two of the four states’ statutes, New York’s and Maryland’s, that include the contractual 
requirement language in the “A” prong apply solely to the construction or landscape industry, 91 
indicating that such a high bar may be either appropriate or politically feasible only when 
regulating an industry known for informal and illegal contracting structures. Moreover, the 
distinct attention arising from a singular industry being the subject of a legislative change 
arguably places its employers and workers on notice of new demands, including the need for a 
written contract to validly work outside employee status. 
Notably, three other states with legislation targeted at the construction industry have 
eliminated the “B” (course of business) prong and instead incorporated a requirement for a written 
contract or a license, parallel to the “A” contractual requirement in formalizing a legitimate 
independent contractor: Pennsylvania’s construction-only statute explicitly demands a written 
contract;92 New Mexico’s construction law includes licensure as an added factor;93 and Oregon’s 
universal law demands “relevant” licenses, which only exist for certain industries.94 Additionally, 
under Minnesota’s construction-only law, for a worker to be an independent contractor, the 
individual must register with the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry.95 A former 
version of Maine’s workers’ compensation statute also required a contract defining the worker 
relationship as one of a list of non-dispositive factors.96 While a solely subjective standard is 
potentially vulnerable to manipulation, a demand for contracts functionally bans legitimate but 
informal independent contracting structures; that trade-off is clearly one states have not yet found 
advantageous outside the construction industry. 
The “B” prong shifts attention to the character of the work itself, in relation to the 
business of the employer, requiring that independent contracting be performed outside the usual 
course of the employer’s business. This prong also has a common variation: four states—
Maryland, Nebraska, New Jersey, and Washington—have included an allowance that work 
performed outside the physical places of the employer’s business suffices as indicia of 
independent contracting.97 Only Nebraska and Washington’s statutes are universally applicable 
(although they only applies under the Workers’ Compensation statute, they apply to all 
industries);98 the other two only regulate specific industries.99 
                                                                  
91  N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-c(1)(a) (McKinney 2014); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 3-902, 3-903 (West 
2014). 
92  43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.3(a)(1) (West 2014). 
93  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-3.1(A)(2)(West 2014). 
94  OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.600(2)(c) (West 2014) (referencing licensing requirements for architects, 
landscapers, and construction workers). 
95  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 326B.701 subdiv. 2 (West 2014). 
96  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 102(13) (2010) (repealed 2011). 
97  MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-903(c) (LexisNexis 2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-604(5)(b) 
(LexisNexis 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-4(b) (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.04.140(1)(b) (West 2014). 
98  NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-604 (LexisNexis 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.04.140 (West 2014). 
99  MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 3-902, 3-903(c) (LexisNexis 2014);; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-4 (West 
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In contrast, the above-mentioned statutes in Pennsylvania, Oregon, and New Mexico 
have entirely replaced the “B” factor with demands for contracts and licenses.100 Notably, 
Pennsylvania provides additional factors including the maintenance of a separate place of 
business by the independent contractor.101 In many industries, such as construction, but also 
trucking and delivering, as in the high-profile FedEx case, occupations routinely occur outside the 
employer’s physical place of business.102 For these workers, treating the physical location of work 
as a signal of independent contractor status is arguably overbroad and may heighten their 
vulnerability to misclassification. The contrasting strategies in regulations for the construction 
industry perhaps illustrate a tension between capturing misclassification in an industry rife with 
illegal practices and preserving the ability of employers to hire independent contractors 
legitimately underlying these laws, particularly where profitability demands such structures. 
Clearly states have weighed these concerns differently, as some enable employers to use 
independent contractors at other locations while other states have tightened requirements. 
Finally, the “C” prong examines the character of the independent contractor herself, 
requiring that she be “customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, 
profession, or business,”103 arguably the prong most likely to narrow legitimate independent 
contracting. States have most drastically altered this prong from the classic model. In 
Massachusetts and Maryland, the prong’s demands are uniquely heightened, with a requirement 
that such work also be “of the same nature as that involved” in the service performed.104 This 
prong’s analysis particularly necessitates subjective interpretation, introducing complexity as 
courts use common law factors to apply the formulation to an individual worker. This outcome is 
apparent in Washington, where courts, at least in the unemployment context, have analyzed the 
presence of an independently established business by citing to a seven-factor test first set out in 
1993.105 In Affordable Cabs v. Department of Employment Security, the state’s court of appeals 
found a taxicab driver to be an employee because he had not “solicited, advertised, or otherwise 
held himself out to the community as being in a separate business,” had not “established himself 
as a separate business . . . .[,] did not own his taxi, records, or customer lists,” and “could not 
continue his business” without the relationship to the employer.106 These factors are beneficial to 
workers in their objectivity and longevity. However, judicial explication of statutory language 
                                                                  
2014). 
100  See 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.3 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.600 (West 2014); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 60-13-3.1(A) (West 2014). 
101  43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.3(b) (West 2014). 
102  See Laura Stevens, Court Says FedEx Drivers Were Employees, Not Contractors, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL, (updated Oct. 3, 2014, 8:58 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/court-says-fedex-drivers-were-employees-not-
contractors-1412382296. 
103  See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.04.140(1)(c) (West 2014). 
104  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148B(3) (West 2014); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-
903(c)(1)(ii)(2) (LexisNexis 2014). 
105  See, e.g., Penick v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 917 P.2d 136, 144-45 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (listing as indications 
of an independent business: “(1) worker has separate office or place of business outside of the home; (2) worker has 
investment in the business; (3) worker provides equipment and supplies needed for the job; (4) the alleged employer fails 
to provide protection from risk of injury or non-payment; (5) worker works for others and has individual business cards; 
(6) worker is registered as independent business with state; and (7) worker is able to continue in business even if 
relationship with alleged employer is terminated”) (citing Jerome v. State of Washington, 850 P. 2d 1345, 1348 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1993). 
106  101 P.3d 440, 445 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol18/iss1/2
ABC ON THE BOOKS FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/15  3:14 PM 
2015] ABC ON THE BOOKS AND IN THE COURTS 71 
undoubtedly generates less consistency and diminishes notice to employers and employees alike. 
Presumably in response to this challenge, four states, Maine, New Mexico, Oregon, and 
Pennsylvania, have codified specific requirements needed to satisfy “C.”107 Maine’s law entirely 
replaced the “C” prong with its mandatory criteria.108 Although the states’ lists are not identical, 
they feature shared objective characteristics of independent businesses. New Mexico, Oregon, and 
Pennsylvania all ask for the maintenance of a separate business location.109 All four states also 
look for evidence of other business relationships: New Mexico and Oregon consider two or more 
clients in one year;110 Pennsylvania allows for a business that is available for other 
employment;111 Maine requires the right and opportunity to work for multiple entities at the 
contractor’s discretion.112 Finally, all four states also provide for indicia of financial liability, 
whether framed as financial responsibility,113 as significant investment,114 as bearing the risk of 
losses,115 or as exposure to liability.116 These rules lack the simplicity of a plain ABC structure 
and prevent the expansion of a standard that is applicable across state lines. Still, if effectively 
communicated to employers and workers, these factors could provide a transparent, consistent, 
and objective standard of an “independent business” and thus an independent contractor. 
3. The Role of the Rebuttable Presumption 
An initial presumption of employee status has been more implemented than any other 
form or feature of the ABC test: only two states, Kansas and Maine, chose to omit an explicit or 
implicit—via mandatory criteria—presumption of employee status from their legislative 
redefinition of independent contracting.117 Irrespective of variations in the substantive standards 
applied to overcome it, the presumption effectively shifts the burden for establishing a legitimate 
independent contracting relationship from the worker to the employer. By placing the onus on 
employers to proactively establish their workers as independent contractors, the presumption 
transforms the assessment of independent contracting status. 
Such debates or adjudications must focus not on an after-the-fact placement of a worker 
into a category of employment or independent contracting, but instead on an employer’s 
compliance with the independent contracting exception to the rule of employment. The 
presumption’s universal application provides an efficient hurdle by removing the need to tailor 
analysis distinctly to well-established business structures such as subcontracting versus more 
                                                                  
107  See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1043(11)(E) (2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-3.1(A) (West 2014); 
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.600(3) (2014); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.3(b) (West 2014). 
108  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1043(11)(E) (2014). 
109  See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-3.1(A)(6) (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.600(3)(a) (2014); 43 
PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.3(b)(4) (West 2014).  
110  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-3.1 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.600(3)(c) (2014). 
111  43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.3(b)(5)(ii) (West 2014). 
112  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1043(11)(E)(1)(a), (c) (2014). 
113  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-3.1(A)(6)(f) (West 2014). 
114  OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.600(3)(d) (West 2014). 
115  OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.600(3)(b) (West 2014); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.3(b)(2) (West 2014); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1043(11)(E)(c) (2014). 
116  43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.3(b)(6) (West 2014).  
117  See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1043(11)(E) (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-703(i)(3)(D) (West 
2014).  
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unusual business structures, which may have been created by employers trying to circumvent the 
law. Some argue that for exactly this reason, the presumption’s barrier overreaches and blocks 
legitimate but “unconventional” employment relationships.118 However, the potency and 
conceptual directness of the presumption puts employers on notice that in order to lawfully craft 
novel structures, they must observe independent contracting boundaries. 
The presumption can also root out common misclassification tactics, including the 
establishment of multiple tiers of subcontractors to shift liability and shield a general contractor; a 
widespread practice in the construction industry.119 In one illuminating workers’ compensation 
dispute in New York, a window installation general contractor and subcontractor both attempted 
to evade liability for a worker’s on-the-job injury.120 The state Workers’ Compensation Board 
considered that New York’s Construction Industry Fair Play Act, which enacted a presumption 
and ABC test, did not apply because the worker was injured prior to the implementation of the 
Act.121 The board explicitly noted that under the Act the presumption would have established an 
employer-employee relationship; instead, under the prior law, the board found an employee 
relationship to the uninsured subcontractor.122 The decision partly turned on the subcontractor 
aligning with the general contractor to argue that the worker was an independent contractor, rather 
than arguing that the subcontractor and worker were both employees of the general contractor.123 
The incentives are clear: if the subcontractor can simultaneously maintain its bottom line and 
preserve its business relationship with the general contractor, there is no reason to argue that a 
worker has an employee relationship to either entity. 
In contrast, a presumption of employment would have shifted that burden, by forcing the 
general contractor and subcontractor to proactively establish that each subordinate entity was an 
independent contractor. In turn, the subcontractor would have had to choose between 
demonstrating that the worker was an independent contractor, or that both the subcontractor and 
worker shared employee status under the general contractor.124 In this way, the presumption could 
be a powerful tool for realigning the interests of workers and subcontractors and for protecting the 
interests of workers without placing the burden of asserting such claims on their shoulders alone. 
4. Impacts of Contrasting Implementation Strategies for Definitional Changes 
The efficacy of the presumption and of the ABC definition also rest on the choices states 
                                                                  
118  E.g., Karen R. Harned, Georgine M. Kryda & Elizabeth A. Milito, Creating a Workable Legal Standard 
for Defining an Independent Contractor, 4 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L.93, 102 (2010). 
119  See CARRÉ & WILSON, supra note 16, at 8 (noting that employers in the Maine construction industry 
“appear to engage in misclassification more frequently than the average of employers across all industries”). 
120  Clearview Window Installation, No. 2070 7169, 2011 WL 4819616, at *2-*3 (N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Bd. 
Aug. 30, 2011). 
121  Id. at *4. 
122  Id. 
123  Id. at *3. 
124  Exclusivity rules in workers’ compensation statutes also shift these incentives: where present, such a 
rule limits the remedies available to eligible employees to workers’ compensation. Thus, where an injured worker sees the 
opportunity to make a tort claim, she may have an interest in arguing to be an independent contractor, while the business 
gains an incentive to argue for employer status. See Steven E. Goren, The Workers’ Compensation Exclusive Remedy Rule 
and Its Exceptions, 71 MICH. B.J. 59, 60 (1992) (discussing why the exclusivity of Michigan’s workers’ compensation 
remedy does not apply to independent contractors). 
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have made about the scope and scale of their application, rather than solely on the simplicity and 
strength of the presumption and the factors. No state has implemented a universally applicable 
ABC test and presumption for all workers and across all statutes governing employee-relevant 
benefits and legal obligations, such as taxes, wage and hour laws, unemployment insurance, and 
workers compensation. Only three states—Maine, New Hampshire, and Oregon—have legislated 
regarding all workers.125 Maine’s change applied only to its workers’ compensation and 
unemployment insurance,126 but the state made its laws consistent with preexisting standards in 
other statutes, creating a matching standard across all laws. Nine states have made definitional 
changes that only regulate the construction industry,127 with one additional state regulating only 
the construction and landscaping industries.128 Finally, Utah passed legislation to presume certain 
entities are employers, but limited its application to solely a subset of independent contracting 
relevant laws.129 
The advantages of a uniformly and universally applicable law are clear: if a worker is an 
independent contractor under one statute and an employee under another, compliance is expensive 
and complex for employers, enforcement becomes inefficient, and workers are hampered from 
asserting their eligibility for benefits and protections. In 2009, Maryland Governor Martin 
O’Malley recognized this barrier when he issued an executive order to create a Joint Enforcement 
Task Force on Workplace Fraud and directly called for overcoming previous reduced “efficiency 
and effectiveness” through coordination across agencies, necessitating a uniform test for use by 
all agencies.130 
A uniform standard can also enhance political support for legislative reform. In 2012, 
Maine Governor Paul LePage used the existence of multiple independent contract definitions as 
the rationale for stating he would introduce legislation to make a presumption and non-ABC test 
uniform across all statutes and workers.131 Governor LePage framed his legislation as a pro-
business measure, arguing that the existence of conflicting standards had “virtually eliminated the 
use of independent contractors by some businesses.”132 Governor LePage said that a single 
                                                                  
125  See An Act to Standardize the Definition of “Independent Contractor,” 2012 Me. Legis. ch. 643 (West); 
Act of July 17, 2007, 2007 N.H. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 362 (LexisNexis); Act of July 28, 2009, 2009 Or. Laws ch. 845 
(West). 
126  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1043(11)(E) (2014) (unemployment); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, 
§ 102(13-A) (workers’ compensation). 
127  See 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.3 (West 2014) (“Construction Workplace Misclassification Act”); N.Y. 
LAB. LAW § 861-c (McKinney 2014) (“New York State Construction Industry Fair Play Act”); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-
2903 to 48-2907 (LexisNexis 2014) (“Employee Classification Act”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 105-A (2009) 
(“An Act to Ensure That Construction Workers Are Protected by Workers’ Compensation Insurance”) (amended 2010 & 
2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.723 (West 2014) (“Construction contractors”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 3501, 3502 
(West 2014) (“Workplace Fraud Act”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-1 (West 2014) (“Construction Industry Independent 
Contractor Act”); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/1 to 185/999 (2014) (“Employee Classification Act”). 
128  See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 3-902, 3-903 (LexisNexis 2014) (“Workplace Fraud Act of 
2009”). 
129  UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-28-2 (LexisNexis 2014). Utah had also previously defined independent 
contractors under its workers’ compensation statute using factors similar to the ABC test, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-
103(2)(b) (LexisNexis 2014). 
130  See MD. DEP’T OF LABOR, LICENSING AND REGULATION, supra note 18, at 8, app. A. 
131  See Mal Leary, LePage Pledges Legislation to Redefine ‘Employee,’ BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Jan. 23, 
2011), http://bangordailynews.com/2011/01/23/politics/lepage-pledges-legislation-to-define-employee. 
132  Id. 
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standard would “reduce confusion over who’s eligible” for benefits.133 A supporter called the bills 
“‘common-sense’ and ‘business-friendly reforms.’”134 Democrats and organized labor opposed 
the change as “weakening” the previous standard in workers’ compensation and unemployment 
insurance statutes.135 If replicated, reform driven by the business community could trigger a shift 
away from the ABC test. A former aide to Governor LePage and local Republican strategist called 
the change “a national model for reform.”136 Yet, there is no reason that advocates for the ABC 
framework could not wield the same strategy in similarly justifying ABC bills by the cost savings 
of their uniform applicability. 
The choice to legislatively change statutory definitions for only the construction 
industry, or for any other single industry, has more apparent advantages than a definition 
applicable only to certain benefits. As discussed above, the states that have passed construction-
only statutes have frequently applied stringent independent contracting definitions, either the 
ABC test or additional objective requirements such as contracts and licensing.137 These statutes 
have often followed research that identified overrepresentation of the misclassification abuses in 
the construction industry, making a broader application politically challenging and of debatable 
necessity.138 By targeting political capital at the industry widely understood to be the greatest 
culprit of misclassification, construction industry-only statutes can also serve as functional pilot 
programs, whose effectiveness can be used as evidence for legislative expansion to all industries. 
However, a strategy that starts and ends with the construction industry will leave workers 
unprotected in industries where these harms are less widespread or publically known. 
B. “Enforcement” Statutes and Strategies 
Nineteen states have passed legislation strengthening or transforming enforcement 
against the misclassification of workers, both instead of and in addition to definitional changes to 
existing statutes.139 Unlike statutory definitions of independent contracting, there is no dominant 
                                                                  
133  LePage Signs Workers Comp, Unemployment Bills, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Apr. 18, 2012), 
http://www.pressherald.com/news/LePage-signs-workers-comp-unemployment-bills.html. 
134  Id. 
135  Id. 
136  See Dan Demeritt: Responsible Representing Calls for Responsible Criticism, PORTLAND PRESS 
HERALD (Oct. 7, 2012), http://www.pressherald.com/opinion/responsible-representing-calls-for-responsible-
criticism_2012-10-07.html?pagenum=full. 
137  See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-c (McKinney 2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-2903 (LexisNexis 2014); 
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-903 (LexisNexis 2014); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.3 (West 2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 60-13-3.1 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.600(2)(c) (West 2014). 
138  See, e.g., DONAHUE, LAMARE, & KOTLER, supra note 17, at 4 (estimating that about 15% of New York 
State’s misclassification occurs in the construction industry). 
139  CAL. LAB. CODE § 226.8 (West 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-72-114 (2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 31-69, 31-69a, 31-288 (West 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3505 (West 2014); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/25, 
/40, /45, /60 (West 2014); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-2-15-2 (West 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-719 (West 2014); MD. CODE 
ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 3-908, 3-909, 3-911 (LexisNexis 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 27C (West 2014); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 181.722, 181.723, 326B.701 (West 2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-2907 (LexisNexis 2014); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-5 (West 2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-3.1(C) (West 2014); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-e 
(McKinney 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.700 (West 2014); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 933.5, 933.6 (West 2014); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 34A-2-110 (LexisNexis 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 692, 708, 1314a (West 2014); WISC. STAT. ANN. 
§ 103.06 (West 2014). 
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model for these new laws. Most states increased or instituted civil penalties for misclassification, 
and several added criminal liability. Wisconsin instituted the power to issue stop-work orders 
against businesses,140 and two states, Oregon and Indiana, enacted laws solely to restructure their 
state agency enforcement process.141 States appear to be experimenting with a myriad of 
enforcement tactics, including targeting intentional misclassification, creating private rights of 
action, and implementing successor liability. Measuring the value of each enforcement tool is 
challenging, as public records documenting enforcement actions are not readily available and 
agency reports often provide data on fines without sufficient context for assessment. Still, 
enforcement statutes have some readily apparent benefits. Unlike definitional changes, assessing 
penalties does not inherently punish businesses currently in compliance, and thus can avoid 
shifting the boundary of legal independent contracting and facing the likely higher political stakes 
of such actions. 
1. Civil Penalty Increases and the Targeting of Intentional Misclassification 
The most common enforcement tactic by state legislatures has been civil penalties for 
misclassification. In contrast to regimes where the only incentive against misclassifying a worker 
was the assessment of back taxes or benefits, these penalties do more than “place[] the employer 
in the same position where he would have been had he properly classified the worker in the first 
instance.”142 Seven states have created or increased such penalties for any business that violates 
the statute.143 Eight states deliver civil penalties to businesses whose violations are intentional, 
either “willful” or “knowing,” depending on the statute. 144 Further, Wisconsin added penalties for 
violating a new stop-work order mechanism,145 while Minnesota implemented a registration 
scheme for construction industry independent contractors including fines for violators.146 
Notably, only Vermont and Maryland provide for liability to carry to a successor 
entity.147 Vermont’s statute signals that liability can extend to “any successor employer that has 
one or more of the same principals or corporate officers,”148 while Maryland applies continued 
                                                                  
140  WISC. STAT. ANN. § 103.06 (West 2014).  
141  See Act of July 28, 2009, 2009 Or. Laws 845 (West) (enacting OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 670.700, 
670.705 (West 2006)) (establishing an “Interagency Compliance Network”); Act of March 25, 2010, 2010 Ind. Legis. 
Serv. P.L. 110-2010 (West) (enacting IND. CODE ANN. § 22-2-15-1 to 22-2-15-6 (West 2010)) (requiring the Indiana 
department of labor to develop and implement guidelines and procedures to respond to misclassification complaints).  
142  Buscaglia, supra note 40, at 121. 
143  820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/40 (West 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 27C(b) (West 
2014); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-908 (Lexis Nexis 2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-2907 (LexisNexis 2014); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-5(b) (West 2014); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.6 (West 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1314a 
(West 2014). 
144  CAL. LAB. CODE § 226.8 (West 2014) (willful), COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-72-114 (2014) (willful); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-69a (West 2014) (knowing); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 3503, 3505 (2014) (knowing); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 44-719 (West 2014) (willful or knowing); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-909 (LexisNexis 2014) (knowing); 
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-e(1) (McKinney 2014) (willful); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 708 (2014) (willful).  
145  WISC. STAT. ANN. §§ 103.005(10), 103.06 (West 2014). 
146  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 326B.701 (West 2014).  
147  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 708(c) (2014); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 3-908(d), 3-909(g) 
(LexisNexis 2014). 
148  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 708(c) (West 2014). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
ABC ON THE BOOKS FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/15  3:14 PM 
76 UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. 18.1 
liability to “any successor corporation or business entity” with “one or more of the same 
principals or officers” who is “engaged in the same or equivalent trade or activity.”149 As such, a 
company should not be able to merely restructure, reincorporate, or entirely disband when faced 
with the liabilities of its misclassification practices. Such strategies may sound extreme, but given 
the already demonstrated propensity for these businesses to break the law, such provisions appear 
to be a valuable mechanism, though perhaps redundant of existing corporate law. 
Many of these statutes arrange fines in two tiers, with a lower fine for the first offense 
and higher fines for every subsequent offense.150 Yet, the price of the fines varies widely. A first 
violation costs only $500 in Nebraska151 but as much as $15,000 in Massachusetts152 and a second 
violation can cost $2,500 in Pennsylvania153 or $25,000 in Colorado.154 Fines between $1,000 and 
$5,000 appear in Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Vermont.155 States 
also include distinct features, such as an explicit indication in Colorado that investigations will 
assess interest in addition to back taxes156 and, in Delaware, an additional $500 per day fine 
against a business under investigation that fails to provide books and records to the relevant 
agency.157 
The use of fines against intentional misclassification, whether “willful” or “knowing,” 
appears to be a simple mechanism to effectively target penalties at bad actors. This tool 
additionally can funnel businesses into desired actions that demonstrate their intent not to 
misclassify workers, perhaps reducing the burden on states to enforce statutes through 
investigations and audits. In addition, some states deliver payment directly to the worker in cases 
of intentional misclassification: punitive matching awards of up to $2,000 to $4,000 in Illinois and 
“restitution” in New Jersey.158 
A few states provide businesses a route to rebut the presumption of an employment 
relationship, in the process providing information to the state about independent contractors. 
Maryland’s construction businesses must provide information to workers and collect signatures 
from independent contractors, while Colorado businesses can seek an advisory opinion from the 
state’s division of unemployment insurance.159 In addition, Maryland and Delaware also have the 
power to assess fines against parties, other than businesses, which knowingly assist 
misclassification. Delaware and Maryland’s statute includes penalties up to $20,000 against any 
                                                                  
149  MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 3-908(d), 3-909(g) (LexisNexis 2014). 
150  See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-2907 (LexisNexis 2014). 
151  Id. 
152  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 27C(b) (West 2014). 
153  43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.6 (West 2014). 
154  COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-72-114(3)(e)(III)(A) (2014). 
155  COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-72-114(3)(e)(III)(A) (2014) (providing minimum fine of $5,000); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 19, § 3505(a) (2014) (providing fines ranging from $1,000 to $5,000); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/40(a) 
(West 2014) (providing maximum fine of $1,000 for first violation, $2,000 for second); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-5 (West 
2014) (providing fines of $100 to $1,000 and administrative penalties up to $5,000); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.6 (West 
2014) (providing maximum administrative penalty of $1,000 for the first violation and $2,500 for the second); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 21 § 1314a(f)(B) (2014) (providing maximum fine of $5,000). 
156  COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-72-114(3)(e)(II) (2014). 
157  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3505 (2014). 
158  820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/45 (West 2014) (allowing for putative damages in amount equal to the 
penalties assessed, which may be double the civil penalties); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-5(a)(2) (West 2014). 
159  MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-903.1 (LexisNexis 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-72-114(4) (2014). 
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knowing assistance as well as knowingly incorporating or forming various business entities to 
evade liability for employees.160 Despite these novel tactics, it is unclear the scope of their use or 
their value on the books without enforcement. 
2. Criminal Liability 
Ten states have also added criminal liability for misclassification to their statutes.161 
Liability often requires intent and tends to be registered as a misdemeanor that is subject to 
prosecution by the state attorney general, as in New Mexico and New York.162 However, 
Connecticut, New Jersey, Illinois, and Utah have made misclassification subject to low-level 
felonies;163 in Illinois misclassification is a felony solely when the crime is a repeat violation.164 
Many states provide for a greater penalty for intentional misclassification: for example, both New 
York and Massachusetts’ dramatic laws allow up to $50,000 fines.165 Although the use of criminal 
liability appears on paper to be an aggressive tactic, the actual assessment of criminal penalties is 
hard to track, as investigations appear to typically be private. New York has most publicly 
pursued criminal enforcement, under both then-Attorney General Andrew Cuomo and current 
Attorney General Eric Schneiderman. The number of cases prosecuted has been small, only six in 
2009, but the state’s Misclassification Task Force has publicized those criminal enforcements.166 
Criminal penalties could, perhaps, be an effective tool for targeting employers whose workforces 
are entirely off the books and those with large-scale misclassification which are insolvent to pay 
fines or back taxes and benefits. 
3. Stop-Work Orders 
Six states have created the ability to issue stop-work orders against businesses 
intentionally failing to comply with the law.167 In Wisconsin, where the law does not afford 
businesses a hearing prior to the order taking effect, the tactic is controversial,168 presumably 
                                                                  
160  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3505 (West 2014); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-915 (LexisNexis 
2014). 
161  CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-69, 31-288(g) (West 2014); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/45(d) (West 
2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-719 (West 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 27C(a) (West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 34:20-5(a)(2) (West 2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-3.1(C) (West 2014); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-e(4) (McKinney 
2014); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.5 (West 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-110 (LexisNexis 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
21, § 692(c) (West 2014) (violation of stop-work order).  
162  See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-3.1(C) (West 2014); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-e(4) (McKinney 2014). 
163  CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-288(g) (West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-5(a)(2) (West 2014); 820 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/45(d) (West 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-110(3)(c)(ii)(B), (C) (LexisNexis 2014). 
164  820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/45(d) (West 2014). 
165  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 27C(a)(1) (West 2014); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-e (McKinney 2014). 
166  N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JOINT ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE ON 
EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION 13 (2010) available at http://www.labor.ny.gov/ui/ 2010Febreport%20with 
%20Cover%20to%20Paterson%20and%20Index.pdf. 
167  See 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.7 (West 2014); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 103.06 (West 2014); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 31-69a, 31-76a (West 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 692(b) (West 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, 
§ 3505(b), (f) (West 2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 105-A(5) (2014). 
168  Troy D. Thompson, Employees vs. Independent Contractors: State Broadens Enforcement of Worker 
Misclassification Issues, INSIDE TRACK (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.wisbar.org/newspublications/insidetrack/pages/ 
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because the costs of a closed business quickly outpace the scale of the civil fines. Nonetheless, 
states are beginning to use stop-work orders as tools: the Connecticut Department of Labor 
reported that its Stop-Work Unit issued 127 stop-work orders in the year from March 2010 to 
February 2011 and collected $38,700 in civil fines from businesses.169 The state’s Joint 
Enforcement Commission identified the orders as more effectively incentivizing businesses 
against misclassification than previous penalties, which the state’s business community had 
complained were “insufficient to deter knowing misclassification violations.”170 Stop-work orders 
are more punitive and more indefinite than monetary penalties, which businesses can calculate 
and build into their cost model. The costs of stop-work orders are not only monetary but also 
reputational. The costs of delayed work are also borne by any impacted customers, providing an 
incentive for customers to negotiate ex ante and pay for properly classified workers or to perhaps 
indicate that the business will shift costs to protect the customer if an order is issued. 
4. Enforcement Mechanisms: Coordinated Investigations and Increased Resources 
Predictably, the actual impact of many of these increased penalties for employee 
misclassification is determined by the shape and scale of their enforcement. The heart of 
misclassification investigations in many states has been the creation and implementation of task 
forces.171 Other states have incorporated information sharing and restructuring of multi-agency 
enforcement into their independent contractor statutes. Indiana is one such state, having passed a 
statute mandating the sharing of information between agencies about businesses found to 
misclassify employees.172 Illinois and Delaware similarly require cooperation and information 
sharing about businesses suspected of misclassification.173 Illinois creatively made its independent 
contracting investigations self-sustainable by allocating all collected civil fines to the statute’s 
administration and its resulting investigations.174 
5. Enforcement by Workers: Private Rights of Action and Anti-Retaliation Provisions 
Finally, six states—Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey, and 
Washington—have additionally established private rights of action, empowering aggrieved 
workers to initiate suits against an employer violating the independent contracting statute.175 In 
Delaware, a worker may initiate an action only after he has filed a complaint to the state and 
                                                                  
article.aspx?volume=2&issue=17&articleid=7800. 
169  CONN. JOINT ENFORCEMENT COMM’N ON EMP. MISCLASSIFICATION, supra note 23, at 2. 
170  Id. 
171  See, e.g., MD. DEP’T OF LABOR, LICENSING AND REGULATION, supra note 18, at 2; MD. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, LICENSING AND REGULATION, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JOINT ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE ON WORKPLACE 
FRAUD 4 (2011), available at http://www.dllr.maryland.gov/workplacefraudtaskforce/wpftfannrep2011.pdf (reporting that 
over $600,000 had been paid into the state’s unemployment trust fund from fraud audits). 
172  IND. CODE ANN. § 6-8.1-3-21.2(c) (West 2014). 
173  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 § 3507 (West 2014); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/75 (West 2014). 
174  820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/50 (West 2014). 
175  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3508 (West 2014); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/60 (West 2014); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 150 (West 2014); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-911 (LexisNexis 2014); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 34:20-8(b) (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.170(3) (West 2014). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol18/iss1/2
ABC ON THE BOOKS FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/15  3:14 PM 
2015] ABC ON THE BOOKS AND IN THE COURTS 79 
ninety days have passed without state investigation.176 However, the interest of states in inviting 
employee reports to be part of their enforcement schemes is perhaps suspect. Explicit anti-
retaliation provisions in four states—Delaware, Illinois, New York, and Vermont—protect 
workers who complain of misclassification to an agency or file a lawsuit complaining of 
misclassification.177 Illinois also allows for “[a]ny interested party” to either file suit or to file a 
complaint with the state if that party has a “reasonable belief” that the employer is violating the 
statute.178 Considering the competitive harm that misclassification does to businesses who comply 
with the law, this mechanism could provide a valuable tool for compliant businesses to enforce 
misclassification laws against noncompliant businesses, providing additional buy-in to the 
legislation and empowering private actors possessing more resources than workers to assist in 
enforcement. 
III. EMPLOYER ATTEMPTS TO EVADE MISCLASSIFICATION  
LAWS IN ADJUDICATIONS 
With the passing of these stricter independent contractor statutes, some employers have 
developed new strategies to avoid liability for misclassification. This Part will provide an analysis 
of how these statutes are faring against such strategies in adjudications. We focus on the successes 
and weaknesses of the ABC test, as it is the most common test used in recent legislation. This test, 
or a variation of it, is employed by fourteen of the sixteen states that have changed the statutory 
definition of independent contractor.179 Where courts have failed to provide an adequate response 
to employer strategies, we will suggest alternative arguments for workers and enforcement 
agencies, as well as legislative solutions. 
Because many of the independent contractor misclassification statutes have passed 
within recent years, this discussion is preliminary. We will concentrate largely on adjudications in 
Massachusetts and Washington, where the statutes are older and not industry specific, providing 
more opportunity for litigation. This discussion will include cases litigated under Washington’s 
Unemployment Insurance independent contractor definition, an ABC statute enacted in 1991.180 
This statute’s age in particular has allowed ample time for significant case law to develop. While 
impediments to holding employers liable for misclassification are not necessarily widespread, 
they may become more pervasive. In some cases, these new strategies may lead employers further 
from the reach of the law, as some engage in tactics the law does not yet condemn. We do not 
attempt to document every argument or tactic, but instead focus on common approaches used by 
employers, including the use of subcontracting, misclassification of workers as business entities, 
                                                                  
176  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 § 3508(a) (West 2014). 
177  820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/55 (West 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3509 (West 2014); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 710(d) (2014); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-f (McKinney 2014). 
178  820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/25 (West 2014). 
179  DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 19, § 3501 (West 2014); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/10 (West 2014); MD. 
CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-903 (LexisNexis 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148B (West 2014); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 181.723 (West 2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-2903 (LexisNexis 2014) (referencing NEB. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 48-604(5)(a) (LexisNexis 2014)); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:4 (2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-4 (West 2014); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-3.1 (West 2014); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-c (McKinney 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.600 
(West 2014); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.3 (West 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-103 (LexisNexis 2014); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 50.04.140 (West 2014). Cf. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-703 (West 2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, 
§ 102(13-A) (2014). 
180  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.04.140 (West 2014). 
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and the common exploitation of semantic distinctions to claim that a worker meets the elements 
of the independent contractor test. 
Before exploring employer attempts to evade these new laws, it important to note that 
not every employer is responding to stricter laws by trying to exploit their weaknesses. Many 
businesses already classify workers correctly as employees, and others are now reclassifying their 
independent contractors as employees in response to these new laws.181 Additionally, many law 
firms are advising clients to classify correctly.182 The recent wave of legislation has not solely 
pushed employers further outside the reach of the law, but has also encouraged many employers 
to comply. 
A. New Misclassifications: Workers as Business Entities 
One strategy that some employers have used to avoid liability under stricter independent 
contractor misclassification statutes is to reclassify their independent contractors not as 
employees, but as business entities. This tactic may prevent employers from being held liable for 
misclassification because some state laws provide that corporations cannot be employees,183 while 
others fail to address whether different corporate forms can be considered employees.184 By 
classifying workers as business entities, employers can contract with an independent business or 
                                                                  
181  See COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., JOINT ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE ON THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY 
AND EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2011), http://www.mass.gov/lwd/eolwd/jtf/annual-report-
2011.pdf (“The majority of Massachusetts employers pay their applicable taxes, classify their workers legally, and 
contribute in a responsible manner as a part of our economy and as members of the community.”); Renee Inomata, Perils 
of Misclassification of Workers as Independent Contractors, in INSIDE THE MINDS: COMPLYING WITH EMPLOYMENT 
REGULATIONS 23 (2012), available at 2012 WL 3279180, at *6 (“[C]osts of class actions are driving decisions by 
employers to reclassify workers as employees and to seek prompt and private resolutions of misclassification 
allegations.”); WASH. STATE DEP’T OF LABOR & INDUS., 2010 ANNUAL FRAUD REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 14 (2010) 
(finding approximately three percent of businesses reclassified workers after being educated about new independent 
contractor definitions). 
182  See Inomata, supra note 181, at *7 (“In the ever-changing world of employment regulations, counsel and 
clients alike should proactively take reclassification efforts seriously to avoid having to defend actions by government 
agencies and class action lawyers.”); Sharon L. Davis & Gregory S. Galaida, Misclassification of Workers: “Saving 
Money” Can Be Very Costly, 39-DEC COLO. LAW. 57, 57 (Dec. 2010) (“Given the potential for liability, employers must 
be extra vigilant with respect to classification of workers as independent contractors.”); Vaughn Burkholder & Tara 
Eberline, Misclassification of Workers as Independent Contractors, 18 No. 2 KAN. EMP. L. LETTER 1 (May 2011) 
(“Because of the increased scrutiny on worker misclassification, employers must be extra vigilant to make sure their 
workers are properly classified.”); Scott Holt, Will ‘Misclassification Initiatives’ Reduce Employers’ Use of Independent 
Contractors?, 15 NO. 4 DEL. EMP. L. LETTER 6 (Apr. 2010) (encouraging employers who employ independent contractors 
to conduct internal audits and reviews of worker classifications); Kevin Sullivan, Paying Workers as Independent 
Contractors? Better Think Twice, 22 NO. 4 CAL. EMP. L. LETTER 4 (May 21, 2012) (urging California businesses to seek 
counsel to determine if workers are properly classified under California law); Jasmin M. Rojas, Misclassification Can be 
Costly—and Unfair!, 23 NO. 7 MASS. EMP. L. LETTER 3, (Oct. 2012) (“As a result of the intense scrutiny in this area, you 
should review your practices and double-check to make sure you aren’t inadvertently misclassifying employees.”); Robert 
C. Nagle, Employers Facing Increased Scrutiny Over Worker Classification, 20 NO. 9 PA. EMP. L. LETTER 1 (June 2010) 
(encouraging employers to review and audit worker classifications). 
183  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.723 (West 2014) (stating that individuals will be presumed to be 
employees unless they meet certain criteria, and defining the term “individual” as “a human being”).  
184  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148B (West 2014) (stating that individuals performing any 
service will be considered employees unless they meet certain criteria, without defining the term “individual”).  
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limited liability corporation, instead of an individual worker. Employers sometimes also classify 
workers as franchisees, partners or owners of the employers’ own business. This Part will provide 
an overview of this strategy, potential solutions, and a discussion of employers’ ability to utilize 
this tactic under different statutory schemes. 
At first brush, it seems logical to prevent a worker from being considered an employee if 
the worker is in fact the owner of his or her own independent business. Indeed, this is one 
scenario where the independent contractor designation was intended to apply.185 However, in 
some instances, employers contract with workers as owners, franchisees, or partners to explicitly 
avoid worker protections and tax obligations that come with employee status, when these workers 
are not actually franchisees, partners, or owners of anything more than a shell corporation. In 
some cases, employers have conditioned hiring a worker on the worker obtaining a business 
license.186 Other employers have unsuccessfully argued that the worker is actually a partner in the 
employer’s own business.187 After the misclassification statute was passed in Minnesota, there 
was an increase in workers forming limited liability corporations.188 This increase was specifically 
noted in the construction industry, the only industry covered by the statute.189 Similarly, in 2011 
Utah initiated seventy-five enforcement actions against employers who misclassified workers as 
owners in the employers’ limited liability corporation.190 These employer tactics have the same 
purpose as misclassifying employees as independent contractors; employers are merely using new 
labels to achieve the same results. As stated by Utah’s Deputy Commissioner of the Labor 
Commission, Alan Hennebold, “‘we will see individuals who are clearly employees called 
independent contractors. Now, we’re seeing them called members of LLCs. The beat goes on.’”191 
To make matters worse, companies have emerged to assist employers in assembling 
these new classifications to avoid liability under new independent contractor statutes.192 For 
example, in Utah, there are businesses that help employers classify workers as owners of limited 
liability corporations.193 One such company, U&I LLC, helps employers classify their own 
workers as owners in U&I LLC.194 U&I LLC advertises that this will help companies save on 
labor costs, such as unemployment, workers compensation and payroll taxes.195 U&I LLC also 
                                                                  
185  See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 34, at 297 (“‘[I]ndependent contractors’ are clearly employers or business 
owners in their own right and are not employees of the persons they serve.”). 
186  See Kabrick v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, No. 20126-1-III, 2002 WL 91270, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 
2002) (“Spokane Cab required its drivers to obtain independent business licenses before being allowed to drive for 
them.”). 
187  See Leffler v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 63900-5-I, 2009 WL 3419587, at *4-5 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 
26, 2009) (finding construction workers were not partners in the employer’s business); Penick v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 917 
P.2d 136, 143-45 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (finding truck drivers were employees and not participants in joint ventures).  
188  ADVISORY TASK FORCE ON EMP. MISCLASSIFICATION, REPORT TO THE 2011-2012 BIENNIUM, EIGHTY-
SEVENTH LEGISLATURE 8 (2011), available at http://archive.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2011/mandated/110509.pdf. 
189  Id. 
190  UTAH WORKER CLASSIFICATION ENFORCEMENT COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORT 3-4 (2011), available at 
http://laborcommission.utah.gov/media/pdfs/laborcommission/pubs/AnnualReport2011final.pdf. 
191  Lori Prichard, KSL 5 News Investigates Potential Worker Misclassification in Construction Industry, 
KSL.COM, (Mar. 26, 2010), http://www.ksl.com/?nid=148&sid=10934339. 
192  Id. 
193  Id. 
194  Id. 
195  Id. 
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advertises that this system will still allow employers to exert control and provide direction to their 
worker-owners,196 a benefit employers would have to sacrifice if they correctly classified their 
workers as independent contractors. Another company, CSG Workforce, which appears to no 
longer be in business,197 at one point had 1,500 “member owners,” or workers, that were classified 
as owners in its company.198 After being re-classified, these workers worked largely in the same 
capacity.199 Such tactics have harmed workers and state coffers by providing a mechanism that 
enables employers to avoid paying benefits, payroll taxes, and workers compensation 
insurance.200 The negative impact does not fall solely on workers: companies that do comply with 
classification statutes have expressed concern over the impact these tactics have had on their 
ability to compete in the marketplace.201 
1. The Impact of Different Statutory Models on Employers’ Ability to  
Exploit a Worker’s Business Status 
Misclassification of workers as business entities has already arisen in court 
adjudications, and the result the court reaches may depend on the state’s statutory scheme. Some 
states’ statutes are silent as to whether a corporation can be considered an employee.202 Other 
state employment laws, including but not limited to the independent contractor statute itself, 
however, may specifically exempt corporations from being considered employees.203 Similarly, 
some courts have interpreted ambiguous employment statutes to mean that corporations cannot be 
employees.204 For states in these latter categories, it will be more difficult for workers to argue 
that they are employees who have been misclassified as business entities. 
However, where courts simply apply the ABC test to determine whether a worker is an 
independent contractor, regardless of whether the worker was working in her individual capacity 
or under the name of a corporation, the ABC test sufficiently protects both employers and 
employees: it protects employers from having true business entities classified as employees, and 
                                                                  
196  Id. 
197  See BBB Business Review: CSG Workforce Partners LLC, BETTER BUS. BUREAU 
http://www.bbb.org/utah/business-reviews/contractors-general/csg-workforce-partners-in-provo-ut-22232962 (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2015). 
198  Prichard, supra note 191. 
199  See, e.g., id. (“Even though one would expect an ‘owner’ to have influence over their workday, Delgado 
[who was classified as a member owner of CSG Workforce] says he still took orders from the same contractors. He was 
occasionally ordered to work six days a week, which job site to report to and what exactly to do.”). 
200  See id. 
201  See id. 
202  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148B (2014) (stating that individuals performing any 
service will be considered employees unless they meet certain criteria, without defining the term “individual”). 
203  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.723 (West 2014) (stating that individuals will be presumed to be 
employees unless they meet certain criteria, and defining the term “individual” as “a human being”). 
204  Tvedt v. Farmers Ins. Group of Cos., 91 P.3d 1, 11 (Mont. 2004) (interpreting the definition of 
employment in Montana’s labor code to prevent a corporation from being an employee of another corporation); Stellar Ins. 
Group, Inc. v. Cent. Cos., No. 2:06cv11, 2006 WL 2862218, at *9 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 12, 2006) (“Plaintiff Stellar, cannot 
allege a cause of action under North Carolina’s Wage and Hour Act inasmuch as a ‘corporation’ cannot be an ‘employee’ 
or wage earner.”); Frank Burns, Inc. v. Interdigital Commc’ns Corp., 704 A.2d 678, 680 (Pa. Super. 1997) (finding that a 
corporation cannot be an employee under Pennsylvania’s Wage Payment and Collection Law).  
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employees from being misclassified by the courts as independent contractors. In a recent case in 
Massachusetts, a state whose statute does not explicitly state whether a corporation can be 
considered an employee, a court did find that one corporate structure, franchisees, could be 
considered employees.205 In making this determination, the court in Awuah v. Coverall North 
America, Inc. (Awuah I) applied Massachusetts’s independent contractor statute to the facts of the 
case without discussing whether the statute applied to franchisees.206 The franchisee plaintiffs had 
entered into a contract to purchase janitorial cleaning franchises from defendant Coverall.207 Until 
May 2009, customer contracts were with Coverall, and unless a customer specifically requested it, 
franchisees could not be parties to these contracts.208 In addition, each time the plaintiffs cleaned 
for a customer, the customer paid Coverall directly.209 The court found that Coverall had 
misclassified the plaintiffs because Coverall was unable to establish that the plaintiffs performed 
services outside of the course of Coverall’s business; the second prong of the ABC inquiry.210 To 
prove this prong, Coverall needed to show that the plaintiffs were performing services as part of 
their own business that was independent from Coverall’s business.211 The court determined that 
like the plaintiff franchisees, Coverall was in the business of selling cleaning services because it 
directly received fees for each service, was a party to each customer contract until May 2009, 
trained the franchisees, and provided them with uniforms.212 
In applying the second prong of the ABC test, the court analyzed whether the workers 
were truly distinct business entities, working in independent businesses outside of the course of 
Coverall’s business, or whether the franchisee title was merely an empty label.213 Thus, the ABC 
test is sufficient to distinguish between employees and business owners who are performing 
distinct services for the employer through their own independent businesses, because this specific 
inquiry is written into the independent contractor test. True business entities should meet each 
element, and be classified as independent contractors. States that prevent corporations from being 
employees are adding an additional, unnecessary layer of protection for employers, leaving 
workers unprotected from this form of misclassification. 
The Awuah I decision may have closed a loophole that was open for years. According to 
a recent article, Awuah “has rocked a significant sector of the U.S. economy that has always 
thought franchise arrangements were immune to employee misclassification claims.”214 It is 
unclear whether other states will follow the lead of the Massachusetts court in Awuah and find 
that franchisees can be misclassified. At the very least, Awuah I has influenced law firm advice to 
                                                                  
205  Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 80, 85 (D. Mass. 2010). 
206  Id. 
207  Id. at 82. 
208  Id. 
209  Id.at 82, 84. 
210  Id. at 84. 
211  Id. at 82. 
212  Id. at 84. 
213  See id. at 82. (“To satisfy the second prong, Coverall must establish that the worker ‘is performing 
services that are part of an independent, separate, and distinct business from that of the employer.’”) (quoting Am. Zurich 
Ins. Co. v. Dep’t of Indus. Accidents, No. 053469A, 2006 WL 2205085, at *4 (Mass. Super. June 1, 2006)).  
214  Rochelle B. Spandorf, Who’s the Boss? Franchisors Must Be Able to Demonstrate the Separate and 
Distinct Businesses That They and Their Franchisees Operate, L.A. LAW., Mar. 2011, at 18, 18; see also W. Michael 
Garner, Employment Relationships, in 1 FRANCHISE & DISTRIBUTION LAW & PRACTICE § 1:30 (2013) (“In 2010, franchise 
practitioners were surprised to learn that a court had ruled a franchised business to be an employee of the franchisor.”). 
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employers. This same article advised California practitioners to focus on assisting franchisor 
clients in reducing liability for such misclassification.215 
Other states have also considered evidence that a worker owns a business as a factor in 
determining whether the worker is an independent contractor, without letting such labels end the 
inquiry. For example, in Western Ports Transportation, Inc. v. Employment Security Department 
of the State of Washington, although the worker, Mr. Marshall, contracted with his employer 
under his business’s name, the court still found that he was an employee.216 The court determined 
that Marshall was not free from his employer’s control because he was required to keep his truck 
clean, to obtain his employer’s permission before transporting passengers, and to go to the 
dispatch center to obtain assignments that had not been scheduled in advance.217 Additionally, he 
could be terminated for any violation of written company policy.218 Thus, the employer failed to 
satisfy the first prong of the ABC test, and Marshall was found to be an employee.219 The court 
also noted that his business was unrelated to the work he was performing for the company as a 
truck driver.220 Ultimately, case law suggests that thus far, the ABC test allows courts to look 
beyond labels and evaluate whether workers are truly engaged in a separate business or whether 
the business is being used by the employer to evade wage, tax, and other obligations. 
However, where a state’s statutory scheme explicitly exempts corporate forms from 
being considered employees, a court may be unable to evaluate whether the worker is operating a 
distinct business. In Nelson v. Levy, the Minnesota Court of Appeals found that plaintiff Nelson’s 
Limited Liability Corporation, C. Nelson Tile Installation, could not be considered an employee 
of Majestic Tile & Stone, LLC under Minnesota’s construction-specific independent contractor 
statute.221 The Minnesota statute presumes that individuals who perform services for a person are 
employees, and defines an “individual” as “a human being.”222 At the time the case was decided, 
the statute required such individuals to obtain an independent contractor exemption certification 
to overcome the employee presumption.223 Because the statute defines individual as “a human 
being,” the court reasoned that under the plain statutory language, C. Nelson Title Installation, as 
an LLC, could not obtain such an exemption.224 The court then determined that it had two 
choices; it could either automatically find LLCs in the construction industry to always be 
employees, or it could conclude that the distinction between employees and independent 
contractors was inapplicable to LLCs in the construction industry.225 It chose the latter, holding 
that “an LLC is not the employee of another entity.”226 As a result of Nelson, any employer in the 
Minnesota construction industry can require workers to create their own limited liability 
corporations as a condition of employment, to avoid the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 181.723, 
                                                                  
215  Spandorf, supra note 214. 
216  W. Ports Transp., Inc. v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t of Wash., 41 P.3d 510, 514, 520 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). 
217  Id. at 517-18. 
218  Id. at 518 
219  Id. at 520. 
220  Id. at 514. 
221  Nelson v. Levy, 796 N.W.2d 336, 342-43 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). 
222  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.723 (West 2014). 
223  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.723 subdiv. 4 (West 2011) (amended 2012). 
224  Nelson, 796 N.W.2d at 342. 
225  Id. 
226  Id. at 342-43. 
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and to avoid paying these worker-owners the minimum wage or overtime, and paying the state 
unemployment, workers compensation and payroll taxes. Although some state statutes punish 
knowing or willing misclassification, if the independent contractor distinction simply does not 
apply, such intentional flaunting of the law is technically legal. Thus, depending on the exact 
statute, it is currently possible for employers to successfully skirt misclassification laws by 
inducing workers to form LLCs and changing their classification of workers from independent 
contractor to owners of an LLC. 
2. Recommendations 
There are potential remedies available to prevent employers from using this strategy to 
avoid liability under misclassification statutes, even for workers in states with statutory language 
that expressly prohibits corporations from being classified as employees. The best solution would 
be a clear statutory amendment that expands the presumption of employee status to include any 
person, partner, owner, or any corporate form or business entity. However, until such amendments 
are made, there are common law solutions available to worker plaintiffs and enforcement 
agencies. Some of these remedies have been untested in the context of independent contractor 
misclassification. Other remedies that will be suggested are based on limited case law. As a result, 
the likelihood of succeeding in these arguments cannot be predicted with certainty. Accordingly, 
the limitations of each argument will be discussed. 
i. Statutory Amendments 
Most independent contractor statutes do not explicitly extend the presumption of 
employee status to all workers who are business entities. An amendment to current independent 
contractor statutes that expands the definition of “individual” to include any person, partner, 
owner, or any corporate entity would provide the most protection from misclassification. 
Employers would still be able to prove that a worker’s work was performed as a part of its own 
independent business venture, but employers who force workers into forming their own 
businesses would be punished for misclassification. Although the ambiguous statutes in 
Washington and Massachusetts have led to some favorable court decisions, such statutes still 
leave room for courts to find that the statute precludes corporations from being employees. Thus, 
amendments to current statutes that cure ambiguity would allow workers and employers to avoid 
extensive litigation in the courts. Both workers and employers would know ex ante whether the 
misclassification statute applies to their relationship, reducing uncertainty over classification, a 
benefit to both workers and employers. 
Some states with more recent statutes or statutory amendments have taken steps to try to 
close this loophole. However, most of these statutes or statutory amendments do not cover every 
employer or every potential form of misclassification. For example, Utah recently passed 
amendments clarifying that construction companies that are required to be licensed will be 
presumed to be the employer of all individuals who hold an ownership interest in their 
company.227 However, the statute only applies to unincorporated employers, and will only protect 
                                                                  
227  See Construction Licensees Related Amendments, 2011 Utah Laws ch. 413 (amending UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 34-28-2 to define “unincorporated entity” and create a presumption of employer status). For a listing of 
construction businesses required to be licensed under Utah Law, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-55-301 (LexisNexis 2014). 
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workers who are classified as owners in the employer’s own company.228 
Similarly, Delaware’s independent contractor statute, while an improvement, still does 
not provide enough protection for workers. The statute makes it a violation to: 
[K]nowingly incorporate or form, or assist in the incorporation or formation of, 
a corporation, partnership, limited liability corporation, or other entity, or pay or 
collect a fee for use of a foreign or domestic corporation, partnership, limited 
liability corporation, or other entity for the purpose of facilitating, or evading 
detection of, a violation of this section.229 
Because it may be difficult for plaintiffs to prove that the employer’s conduct was 
knowing, the Delaware statute would be stronger if it presumptively labeled all corporate forms as 
employees, rather than solely imposing liability for such incorporation where the misclassification 
is intentional. 
New York’s statute states that a person will be presumed to be an employee unless it is a 
“separate business entity,” including “any sole proprietor, partnership, corporation or entity that 
may be a contractor.”230 However, a person will only be considered a “separate business entity” 
when the entity meets twelve criteria listed in the statute.231 These criteria include that the 
business entity has substantially invested capital in the entity beyond equipment and a vehicle, 
regularly makes its services available to the general public, and regularly has the right to perform 
such services when it chooses.232 Thus, in contrast to the other statutes, the New York statute 
covers all business entities and the criteria listed would seem to prevent a worker who is merely a 
shell corporation from being considered an independent contractor.233 However, this statute is 
limited in scope as it only applies to the construction industry.234 A statute modeled after the New 
York statute that is applicable to all industries should protect workers from being misclassified as 
business entities. 
ii. Alter Ego Liability 
Even without legislative reform, workers and enforcement agencies can use the theory of 
alter ego liability to argue that courts should ignore these corporate forms, and still apply the 
independent contractor definition to determine whether the plaintiff is an employee. Under alter 
                                                                  
228  UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-28-2(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2014) (“[a]n unincorporated entity that is required to be 
licensed under Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act, is presumed to be the employer of each 
individual who, directly or indirectly, holds an ownership interest in the unincorporated entity”); see also 820 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 185/10 (West 2014) (extending the presumption of employee status to sole proprietors and partnerships, but 
failing to expressly include other business entities in this presumption).  
229  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3503(d) (West 2014). 
230  N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-c (McKinney 2014). 
231  Id. § 861-c(2). 
232  Id.  
233  For another example of a statute that explicitly allows business entities to be employees see OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 670.600(5)(a) (West 2014) (“The creation or use of a business entity, such as a corporation or a limited 
liability company, by an individual for the purpose of providing services does not, by itself, establish that the individual 
provides services as an independent contractor.”). 
234  N.Y. LAB. § 861-c (McKinney 2014). 
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ego liability, a court disregards corporate entity status when that entity is shown to be a fiction or 
a mere instrumentality for another corporation.235 For example, alter ego liability exists when a 
company perpetrates fraud by claiming to do business with another ostensibly separate 
corporation, when in fact the second corporation is a merely a conduit for the company.236 
Applying this theory to the misclassification context, if the fictitious corporation (here, the 
worker) is found to be in fact inseparable from the employer’s company, the court can disregard 
that fictitious entity and hold the employer liable for its use of the worker’s corporate 
classification to avoid proper worker classification. Different states employ distinct factors to 
determine whether one company or individual is the alter ego of another, but common factors 
include undercapitalization, failure to follow statutory incorporation formalities, and neglect of 
corporate requirements such as the holding of regular shareholder or director meetings.237 
Although this theory has been applied in the labor and employment context, 238 it is not 
yet commonly used in suits for misclassification of independent contractors. It thus remains 
unclear whether the theory could be successfully used to hold employers liable for 
misclassification. The general rule that corporate entity status can be discarded under alter ego 
liability is justified as an exception to the policy goal of allowing limited liability through 
incorporation.239 As a result, it may be difficult for plaintiffs to prove that this rare exception 
should be applied in the independent contractor context. Still, plaintiffs have a strong argument 
that the rationale behind limited liability is inapplicable in the worker-owner misclassification 
context. The general notion of “piercing the corporate veil” exists because it is “unjust to permit 
those who control companies to treat them as single or unitary enterprises and then assert their 
corporate separateness in order to commit frauds and other misdeeds with impunity.”240 If the 
worker’s incorporation were appropriate, it should be undertaken to provide the worker with 
limited liability. Under this logic, the alter ego doctrine may be applicable where workers’ 
business entities have no purpose beyond helping their employer avoid tax liability and 
compliance with wage laws. If litigants can demonstrate that the purpose of a worker’s 
incorporation is in fact to shield the employer, it would likely justify an exception to the general 
preference of preserving corporate entities and allow a court to hold the employer liable for 
misclassification. 
Yet, even if plaintiffs successfully argue that alter ego liability is applicable, serious 
limitations may remain. It is possible that under this theory only the state, and not the worker, will 
be able to recover.241 Or, a court may find the worker to be complicit due to her status as the one 
who incorporated the shell corporation, and thus may see her as having unclean hands and bar her 
from benefiting from the discarding of that corporate entity.242 
                                                                  
235  18 LAURA HUNTER DIETZ ET AL., AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE § 52 (2d ed. 2014). 
236  Id. § 63. 
237  See 114 NEIL A. HELFMAN, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE §§ 5-7 (2014). 
238  See 9 EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR § 4:8 (2014) (discussing the application of alter ego liability to 
companies that restructure in an attempt to avoid labor laws); 70 C.J.S. Pensions § 98 (2014) (discussing an alter ego 
corporation’s liability to contribute to a pension plan). 
239  See DIETZ ET AL., supra note 235, at § 63. 
240  Id. 
241  Marc R. Poulos, Melissa Binetti & Robert G. Reiter, Jr., Employees or Independent Contractors? A New 
Test for the Construction Industry, 96 ILL. B.J. 206, 211 (2008).  
242  See generally J.V.B., Annotation, He Who Comes into Equity Must Come with Clean Hands, 4 A.L.R. 
44 (1919) (describing the unclean hands doctrine). 
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Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to determine the alter ego strategy’s 
likelihood of success, or the jurisdictions in which it is most likely to be successful, at least one 
court has found that alter ego theory may be applicable in the independent contractor context. The 
case did not involve an employer’s use of a worker’s separate business to avoid liability, but 
rather the employer’s use of a different shell corporation to shield itself from liability for 
misclassification. In Chicago Regional Council of Carpenters v. Joseph J. Sciamanna, Inc., the 
plaintiffs sued Sciamanna, Inc. for misclassifying its workers as independent contractors.243 
Sciamanna, Inc. argued that it was not the proper defendant because plaintiffs’ employment 
contracts were with an affiliated company, Sciamanna Group East, LLC.244 Sciamanna, Inc. then 
argued that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for alter ego liability between the two companies, 
and that the suit against Sciamanna Inc. should be dismissed.245 The court disagreed and found the 
plaintiffs had sufficiently stated a claim of an alter ego relationship.246 The court based this 
decision on allegations of the two corporations’ common ownership, and that Sciamanna Inc. 
hired plaintiffs, paid them, and ultimately required them to sign backdated independent contractor 
agreements with Sciamanna Group East, LLC.247 Thus, although the factual scenario is slightly 
different, Sciamanna is an example of how the theory of alter ego liability could be applied under 
the independent contractor misclassification framework. 
iii. Applying Other Employment Statutes When the State’s Industry-Specific  
Statute Omits Corporations 
Some states have independent contractor statutes that only apply to workers in specific 
industries, typically the construction industry. In states with such industry-specific statutes, there 
are often multiple statutes or regulations that use different standards to define independent 
contractors in various industries. Where an industry-specific statute explicitly states that 
corporations cannot be employees, plaintiffs may be able to argue that the state’s general 
independent contractor statute should apply instead of the industry-specific statute. 
In Frahs v. Bill’s Automotive, Inc., the court determined that under Minnesota’s general 
independent contractor definition for unemployment, a business entity could be an employee.248 
After Frahs was terminated, he applied for unemployment benefits.249 The Minnesota Department 
of Employment and Economic Development (DEED) then conducted an audit of his employer, 
Bill’s Automotive, Inc. (BAI) and determined that Frahs was an employee of BAI.250 BAI argued 
that Frahs was not an employee under the court’s earlier decision in Nelson v. Levy which held 
that LLCs could not be employees.251 Because BAI paid Frahs’s wages to Frahs’s company, 
Tom’s Automotive, rather than to Frahs directly, BAI contended that Frah’s company could not 
be an employee under Nelson.252 However, the court noted that the statute at issue in Nelson was 
                                                                  
243  No. 08 C 4636, 2009 WL 1543892, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2009). 
244  Id.  
245  Id. 
246  Id. at *3-4. 
247  Id. 
248  No. A11-1182, 2012 WL 1593197, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. May 7, 2012). 
249  Id. at *1. 
250  Id. 
251  Id. at *5 (citing Nelson v. Levy, 796 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011)). 
252  Id.  
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inapplicable in the present case because it only applied to construction workers, and Frahs was not 
a construction worker.253 As a result, the court looked to the applicable law, a statute that defines 
employment as including “services performed by ‘a member of a limited liability company who is 
considered an employee under the common law of employer-employee.’”254 The court determined 
that the statute’s language did not prevent a corporation from being considered an employee and 
thus applied the common law factors codified in the state’s rules to ultimately find Frahs was an 
employee.255 
Under Frahs’s reasoning, Minn. Stat. § 181.723 (“Section 181.723”) should have been 
inapplicable in the court’s decision in Nelson as well. In Nelson, the court decided that Nelson 
could not be considered an employee because he worked for his employer as a limited liability 
corporation and the LLC was not a “human being” as required by the statute.256 Section 181.273 
specifically states that it has limited applicability, only applying to “individuals performing public 
or private sector commercial or residential building construction or improvement services.”257 
Because the statute states that it applies limitedly to only individuals, and defines individuals as 
human beings, Nelson’s LLC fell outside the scope of the statute. Thus, Section 181.723 should 
be inapplicable when the worker is an LLC. This argument would be further buttressed with 
evidence from the legislative history, if available, that the statute was only meant to apply to 
individual construction workers. Even without such evidence, plaintiffs and enforcement agencies 
can still argue that Section 181.723 does not apply to LLCs, and Minnesota courts should instead 
apply Minnesota’s general unemployment compensation regulation that determines worker status 
for unemployment compensation to worker-LLCs. 
Although this strategy may help plaintiffs in some states, it is not ideal. Typically, 
independent contractor statutes that target a specific industry are more protective of workers, as 
they are often passed to combat misclassification in industries with widespread abuse.258 For 
example, Minnesota’s general unemployment independent contractor definition does not presume 
employee status, unlike Minn. Stat. § 181.723, the construction-specific statute.259 Thus, a court 
may be more likely to find that a worker is an independent contractor under the general law than 
under Section 181.723, even if the worker is an employee. Plaintiffs should consider the benefits 
and possible risks of claiming the applicability of different statutes. A plaintiff should first argue 
that he falls within the scope of the more protective statute. For example, plaintiffs might first 
argue that Section 181.723, or a similar, more protective and specific statute, applies to business 
entities that are shell corporations. However, until industry-specific statutes are amended to 
explicitly include misclassification of workers as business entities, employers may try to avoid 
                                                                  
253  Id.; see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.723 subdiv. 2 (West 2014) (“This section only applies to 
individuals performing public or private sector commercial or residential building construction or improvement 
services.”). 
254  Frahs, 2012 WL 1593197, at *5 (quoting MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.035 subdiv. 15(a)(3) (West 2008)). 
255  Frahs, 2012 WL 1593197, at *5; see MINN. R. 3315.0555 (2014). 
256  Nelson v. Levy, 796 N.W.2d, 336, 342-43 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). 
257  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.723 subdiv. 2 (West 2014) (emphasis added). 
258  See, e.g., DONAHUE, LAMARE, & KOTLER, supra note 17, at 4 (noting significant rates of 
misclassification in the construction industry). 
259  Compare MINN. R. 3315.0555 (2014) (“When determining whether an individual is an employee or an 
independent contractor, five factors must be considered and weighed within a particular set of circumstances.”) with 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.723 (West 2014) (presuming an individual in the construction industry is an employee unless 
certain conditions are met). 
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liability by misclassifying workers in a deliberate attempt to avoid liability under new stricter 
statutes. In those cases, a plaintiff may want to argue instead that a broader statute applies. At 
best, that argument would put workers in the same position they were in before the stricter statute 
was passed. 
iv. Remedies for Workers Seeking Unemployment Benefits 
If none of the above strategies apply, a worker who is trying to obtain unemployment 
benefits may still have a remedy. In Rowan v. Dream It, Inc., the Minnesota Court of Appeals, the 
same court that found that construction LLCs could not be considered employees, found that 
Heather Rowan was eligible for unemployment benefits, despite her having contracted with 
Dream It, Inc. as an LLC.260 When Rowan’s hours as a painter for Dream It were reduced, the 
company convinced her to form an LLC, explaining that because her wages would be calculated 
in a different way, she would be able to make up the hours lost by being paid more per hour.261 
The company did not tell her that she would lose her employee status, her eligibility for 
unemployment benefits, and a guarantee of sufficient hours.262 Rowan then formed her own 
limited liability corporation, and per Dream It’s request, signed a resignation letter.263 After 
forming the LLC and resigning, Rowan continued to perform the same services for Dream It.264 
Four weeks later, Dream It stopped giving Rowan assignments and Rowan applied for 
unemployment benefits.265 Although the court followed Nelson in determining that an LLC could 
not receive unemployment benefits because it could not be an employee, it still found that Rowan 
was entitled to unemployment benefits.266 Because Dream It convinced Rowan to form her own 
LLC and only informed her of the advantages, the court found that she had good cause to quit 
when she resigned and formed her LLC.267 Thus, in this particular factual scenario, where a 
worker first works for the employer as an employee, and is subsequently convinced by the 
employer to form an LLC, the worker may be entitled to unemployment benefits. These benefits 
stem from workers having good cause to quit when they stop working under their own individual 
name, and begin working as an LLC. As a result, even if workers are unable to obtain a remedy 
for wage violations or workers compensation, workers may still be able to obtain unemployment 
benefits. 
v. Establishing Liability for Businesses that Assist Employers in this New Misclassification 
If a worker can establish that the employer is liable for misclassifying her as an 
independent contractor by labeling her as a franchisee, limited liability corporation, or some other 
corporate form, she can then try to establish liability for businesses that assist in this 
misclassification. For example, she can argue that companies like U&I LLC, which help 
employers classify workers as owners of LLCs, are liable for aiding and abetting the employer in 
                                                                  
260  Rowan v. Dream It, Inc., 812 N.W.2d 879, 880, 885 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012). 
261  Id. at 880-81. 
262  Id. at 883-84. 
263  Id. at 881. 
264  Id. 
265  Id. 
266  Id. at 882-83, 885. 
267  Id.at 885. 
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misclassification.268 Such liability would apply regardless of how the plaintiff originally 
established the employer’s own liability for misclassification, whether through the statute itself, 
alter ego liability, or a court’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute. 
In Green v. Parts Distribution Xpress, Inc., the court found that a company that supplied 
independent contractor agreements to an employer could be liable for aiding and abetting the 
employer in violating the misclassification statute.269 In so finding, the court acknowledged that 
the independent contractor statute that applied was silent as to the liability of third parties.270 
However, under common law, a party can be liable if it knows another party’s conduct breaches a 
duty and gives this first party substantial support or encouragement in breaching the duty.271 
Because plaintiffs were relying on common law aiding and abetting, and because the 
Massachusetts statutes at issue did not preclude such liability, the court found it irrelevant that the 
Massachusetts statute did not expressly provide for third party liability.272 The court determined 
the plaintiffs had successfully stated a claim for aiding and abetting liability by alleging that the 
defendant knew that plaintiff’s employers “were planning to use the CMS form to deprive Green 
and others similarly situated of their rights as employees and that CMS both substantially assisted 
and acted in concert with PDX and Dealer Tire to accomplish that deprivation.”273 As a result, 
once the employer’s liability is established, this remedy may be used to hold assisting agents 
liable for misclassification, even where the statute is silent as to third party liability.274 However, 
because few cases have applied aiding and abetting liability to those who assist in 
misclassification, and in Green the court was only ruling on a motion to dismiss, it is unclear if 
ultimately such a remedy will be successful in individual cases or if it will be harsh enough to 
prevent more companies like U&I LLC from entering the market. 
vi. Increasing Damage Awards for Workers Misclassified as Franchisees 
In addition to wage remedies, which may be granted when a court finds that employees 
are misclassified as franchisees, plaintiffs may also be entitled to receive damages in the amount 
of the franchisee fees they paid to the franchisor. Awuah v. Coverall North America, Inc. (Awuah 
III) addressed the damages that Awuah I found were owed to plaintiff janitorial workers for their 
misclassification as franchisees.275 The court assessed whether one janitorial worker was entitled 
to damages for the initial franchise fee of $3,250 as well as monthly royalty fees and management 
                                                                  
268  See Prichard, supra note 191. 
269  Green v. Parts Distribution Xpress, Inc., No. 10-11959-DJC, 2011 WL 5928580, at *1 (D. Mass. Nov. 
29, 2011) (declining to dismiss claims against a company alleged to be aiding and abetting misclassification of workers). 
270  Id. at *3. 
271  Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979) (discussing third party liability for aiding 
in the tortious conduct).  
272  Green, 2011 WL 5928580, at *3.  
273  Id. 
274  Id. For a statute that expressly allows for third party liability see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3503(d) 
(West 2014) (“A person shall not knowingly incorporate or form, or assist in the incorporation or formation of, a 
corporation, partnership, limited liability corporation, or other entity, or pay or collect a fee for use of a foreign or 
domestic corporation, partnership, limited liability corporation, or other entity for the purpose of facilitating, or evading 
detection of, a violation of this section.”) (emphasis added). 
275  Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 890, 891-92 (Mass. 2011).  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
ABC ON THE BOOKS FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/15  3:14 PM 
92 UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. 18.1 
fees that totaled to fifteen percent of the amount Coverall charged customers.276 Under the 
Massachusetts independent contractor statute, employees who are misclassified as independent 
contractors are entitled to any “damages incurred” by the misclassification.277 The court found 
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover these franchisee fees as part of the damages incurred for 
misclassification.278 The court reasoned that the contract for these fees violated public policy, as, 
in practice it “operate[d] to require employees to buy their jobs from employers” and thus was not 
entitled to enforcement.279 As a result, workers who are misclassified as franchisees may be able 
to have their franchise fees returned, in addition to the other damages misclassified workers are 
generally are entitled to receive. 
B. Subcontracting 
Some employers have used subcontracting as a way to avoid liability for 
misclassification. Although the presumption of employee status in the ABC test makes it more 
difficult for employers to do so, even the ABC test can be exploited through the use of 
subcontracting structures. Jan-Pro Franchising International, Inc. v. Depianti (Jan-Pro I) 
provides an example of one subcontracting business model that employers may be able to utilize 
to avoid liability, even if misclassification occurs. In Jan-Pro I, plaintiff Jan-Pro Franchising 
International Inc. (JPI) brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment that two of its 
franchisees were not its employees.280 JPI created a franchise brand and franchise process, which 
regional franchises paid JPI for the rights to use.281 Regional franchisees subsequently entered 
into contracts with worker-franchisees to perform cleaning services for customers supplied by the 
regional franchisees.282 At issue was whether the third tier worker-franchisees were employees of 
JPI. 
In applying the Massachusetts ABC test, the court first determined that JPI met the “A” 
prong of the test, as JPI lacked control over the third-tier worker-franchisees; only the regional 
franchise at issue in the case, BradleyMktg Enterprises, Inc. (“BME”), had the ability to hire and 
fire the worker-franchisees and the obligation to pay them.283 Additionally, JPI was not a party to 
the contract between the worker-franchisees and BME.284 The court next determined that the 
worker-franchisees performed services outside the course of JPI’s business, satisfying the “B” 
prong of the test.285 Unlike Awuah I, where the court rejected the franchisor’s claim that it was in 
the franchising business rather than the cleaning business, here, the three-tiered franchise structure 
helped to support JPI’s contention that it truly was in the franchise business.286 JPI was not 
involved in running the day-to-day cleaning businesses, as it did not market cleaning services, 
                                                                  
276  Id. at 894, 900-01. 
277  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 150 (West 2014). 
278  Awuah, 952 N.E.2d at 901. 
279  Id. at 900. 
280  Jan-Pro Franchising Int’l, Inc. v. Depianti, 712 S.E.2d 648, 649 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). 
281  Id.  
282  Id. at 649-50.  
283  Id. at 651. 
284  Id.  
285  Id. at 651-52. 
286  See id. at 651. 
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collect payment from customers, or pay worker-franchisees for cleaning services.287 The court 
determined that JPI merely created a business model and then sold the rights to this model.288 The 
court then decided that the franchisees engaged in a separate business, satisfying prong “C,” for 
some of the same reasons the court relied upon under the previous prongs.289 Because JPI was not 
a party to the BME and worker-franchisee contracts, exerted no control over worker-franchisees, 
and was engaged in the business of franchising, the franchisees were operating a distinct 
business.290 
The court did not determine whether BME had misclassified the worker-franchisees.291 
However, it did mention it might have found differently if the worker-franchisees’ employee 
status under BME was at issue, noting that BME sends invoices to customers, collects customer 
payments, and sends backup franchisees to customers as needed.292 Thus, where a franchisor 
separates itself from the worker-franchisees through another tier of franchisees, the franchisor 
may be able to avoid liability for misclassification, even if the franchisor’s business model defines 
the relationship between the middle franchisee and the worker-franchisees and leads the middle 
franchisee to classify workers as franchisees. As a result, even if courts find that franchisees can 
be considered employees, if franchisors build in enough tiers of franchisees into their model, they 
may be able to avoid liability, and hedge the potential solutions suggested in the previous Part. 
However, where there is control between the franchisor and middle franchisee, workers 
and enforcement agencies may still have a remedy. In Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising 
International, Inc. (Jan-Pro II), a class action was filed by the same workers at issue in Jan-Pro I, 
alleging misclassification.293 The worker-franchisees this time argued that Jan-Pro was vicariously 
liable for BME’s misclassification of the workers because BME was acting as Jan-Pro’s agent.294 
Under the theory of vicarious liability, a party may be liable for another’s tortious acts based on 
its relationship to the tortfeasor, regardless of fault.295 Thus, one possible solution for workers, 
whether misclassified as business entities or independent contractors, is to argue that the 
contractor is vicariously liable for the subcontractor’s acts, based on the master/servant 
relationship between the contractor and subcontractor.296 
The district court certified questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
about the proper vicarious liability standard to apply, as a majority of courts have adopted 
narrower tests in the franchise context and the Massachusetts appellate court had not yet ruled on 
the matter.297 In Kerl v. Dennis Rasmussen, Inc., the court followed this majority approach to a 
franchisor’s vicarious liability, holding that a franchisor may only be held liable if it has control 
                                                                  
287  See id. 
288  Id. at 651-52. 
289  Id. at 652. 
290  Id. 
291  See id. 
292  Id.  
293  Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int’l, Inc., No. 08-10663-MLW, 2012 WL 3835090, at *1 (D. Mass. 
Aug. 31, 2012). 
294  Id. 
295  See Kerl v. Dennis Rasmussen, Inc., 682 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Wis. 2004). 
296  See id. at 331-32. 
297  Depianti, 2012 WL 3835090, at *1-3.  
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or a right of control over the franchisee’s daily operations.298 The court stated that the franchise 
agreement itself cannot establish vicarious liability.299 The court reasoned that because franchisors 
are frequently removed from day-to-day operations, imposing vicarious liability typically 
provides less deterrence for franchisors than for employers.300 As a result, it would be irrelevant 
under this test that the JPI business model in Jan-Pro I and II defined the relationship between 
BME and the worker-franchisors, unless JPI was actually involved in controlling this relationship 
in daily operations. Where courts have adopted the majority test, it may be more challenging for 
franchisee plaintiffs to establish vicarious liability, and this may lead to increased classification of 
workers as franchisees to avoid liability. In this way, new independent contractor statutes may be 
pushing some employers further from the reach of the law; crafty employers who see an 
opportunity in the combination of franchisee classifications and subcontracting models may be 
able to avoid liability. 
Even in this scenario, however, plaintiffs may not be completely without a remedy. Just 
as workers may be able to hold liable those who assist employers in business entity 
misclassification, even if workers cannot directly show an employee-employer relationship 
between themselves and the contractor, they may be able to hold the contractor liable for aiding 
and abetting the middle subcontractor in misclassification.301 Thus, under the facts of Jan-Pro I 
and II, if the court were to find that BME misclassified the worker-franchisees, JPI could be held 
liable for aiding and abetting BME in such misclassification by creating the business model that 
was used to circumvent the independent contractor law. Workers’ rights advocates should keep 
watch of this area. If this novel aiding and abetting liability fails302 and enforcement of 
independent contractor misclassification increases, worker-franchisees may become more 
prevalent. 
C. Wage Avoidance 
Some employers have tried to argue that the compensation their workers receive does not 
constitute wages, either as evidence that the worker is not an employee or to avoid or reduce the 
damages owed. Courts may consider payment of wages as a fact that evidences control,303 as 
payment of wages is a factor considered in the common law right-to-control test.304 Additionally, 
in at least one state, a worker must earn wages to be considered engaging in employment, and 
thus to be considered an employee.305 As a result, employers may label payments to their workers 
as something other than wages, or have the customers pay the worker directly, and then 
subsequently charge the worker a fee. If successful, employers can avoid liability under the 
                                                                  
298  Kerl, 682 N.W.2d at 341. 
299  Id. at 338. 
300  Id.  
301  See Green, 2011 WL 5928580, at *3. 
302  See Inomata, supra note 181, at *5 (stating that some consider Green as creating “new law”).  
303  See, e.g., Jan-Pro Franchising Int’l, Inc., 712 S.E.2d at 651 (finding that the fact that the workers were 
paid by the regional franchisees, not the franchisor, was evidence that the franchisor lacked control over worker-
franchisees).  
304  See Builders Commonwealth, Inc. v. Dep’t of Emp’t and Econ. Dev., 814 N.W.2d 49, 57 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2012) (using mode of payment as a factor in determining employee status in applying the common law control test).  
305  See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.04.100 (West 2014) (defining “employment” as personal service 
performed for wages). 
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independent contractor statutes even if they have misclassified their employees as independent 
contractors. 
In Awuah v. Coverall North America, Inc., (Awuah II), the court discussed the damages 
owed to one plaintiff who was misclassified by Coverall as a franchisee.306 In an effort to reduce 
its damages, the cleaning franchisor tried to argue that the money the “franchisees” received was 
not wages, but rather advances under an accounts receivable financing system.307 Under the 
Coverall system, Coverall paid its workers in advance of receiving payment from customers.308 
However, if the customer failed to pay Coverall within ninety days, the worker was responsible 
for paying back the advance.309 Coverall argued that because the worker at issue never worked 
overtime and received at least minimum wage, the worker did not incur any damages as required 
under the statute, and thus he was not owed any damages for the misclassification.310 However, 
because under Massachusetts law an employer is required to pay its employees within one week 
of the pay period in which such wages were earned, Coverall also had to argue that payments 
were not actually wages, but were advances, and thus Coverall was in compliance with 
Massachusetts law.311 
The court disagreed with Coverall and found that these advances were in fact wages, and 
that Coverall was trying to evade Massachusetts wage law by using this system.312 The court 
stated that at the time the workers completed their cleaning services, they had earned their wages, 
and “[t]o impose an additional contingency of payment from a customer [on the worker], 
particularly where he had no involvement in collecting the payment, is an improper attempt to 
exempt Coverall from the Wage Act.”313 The court ordered Coverall to pay interest on the 
chargebacks, as Coverall had already returned the chargebacks to the worker involved in the 
action.314 
Because the decision involved interpretations of Massachusetts’ statutory law, the district 
court judge then certified questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, including 
whether this accounts receivable financing system was proper.315 In Awuah III, Coverall tried to 
argue that this account receivable financing system benefited workers and customers, enabling 
workers to receive payments earlier and giving them more freedom in their work.316 Coverall 
explained that if workers are at risk of losing income when customers withhold payment, the 
workers have more incentive to provide adequate service, and thus require less supervision.317 
Without this system, Coverall claimed that it would have to increase supervision of the workers, 
which would impinge on the independence the workers currently possess in the workplace.318 
                                                                  
306  Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 740 F. Supp. 2d 240, 243-45 (D. Mass. 2010).  
307  Id. at 244. 
308  Id. 
309  Id. 
310  Id. at 242. 
311  Id. at 243-44. 
312  Id. at 244-45. 
313  Id. at 245. 
314  Id. 
315  Id. at 245; Awuah, 952 N.E.2d at 893. 
316  Awuah, 952 N.E.2d at 896. 
317  Id. 
318  Id. 
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Ultimately, the court agreed with the district court and held that the classification of wages as 
advances violates the Massachusetts Wage Act.319 The court rejected Coverall’s arguments, 
stating that Coverall could impose sanctions or terminate a worker with poor work performance, 
but Coverall could not withhold a worker’s wages as either a sanction or performance 
incentive.320 Thus, although employers have attempted to avoid both liability and damages by 
changing how they label the worker and the worker’s wages, in both contexts, courts appear to be 
looking beyond the employer’s label.321 
In some states, by labeling income as something other than wages, employers can 
actually prevent a worker’s claim from even being considered. In Washington, the same issue 
raised in Awuah has surfaced. However, because the Washington unemployment insurance statute 
is structured differently, the issue arises before the determination of damages. Although 
Washington has instituted a presumptive ABC test to define independent contractors,322 first a 
worker must prove that he is engaging in employment, which requires showing that he is 
performing personal services for wages.323 Thus, if a court determines that a worker was not paid 
wages, the claim will not proceed. In Kabrick v. Employment Security Department of the State of 
Washington, the Court of Appeals of Washington upheld the Employment Security Department’s 
denial of unemployment benefits to Barbara Kabrick for this very reason.324 The court found that 
as a taxi driver for Spo-Cab Inc., Ms. Kabrick did not earn wages because the money she was paid 
by customers did not belong to Spo-Cab.325 If Ms. Kabrick was paid in cash, she kept the entire 
fare, and if a customer paid by credit card, Spo-Cab would return almost the entire fare to her, 
except for a small handling fee.326 Consequently, the court found that Spo-Cab merely “facilitated 
their collection of fares” rather than paid wages, and as a result, Ms. Kabrick was not engaging in 
employment for Spo-Cab.327 
These threshold questions heavily increase the burden on workers, a result contrary to 
the intention of the presumptive employee statute. Moreover, the wage inquiry may actually have 
little to do with whether one is in reality an independent contractor. As such, including wages as a 
threshold factor not only increases the burden on workers, but also significantly heightens the 
importance of a factor that may be irrelevant. For example, in the Washington court’s 
consideration of what constitutes wages, the court defines the wage test as whether the money 
ever belonged to the employer.328 This test leaves room for crafty employers to evade the law 
                                                                  
319  Id. at 893, 896-97, 901. 
320  Id. at 897. 
321  See also Builders Commonwealth, Inc., 814 N.W.2d at 58 (finding employer’s labeling of payments as 
“advances” or “loans” was not controlling and that such “advances” were wages under Minnesota unemployment 
insurance law). 
322  See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.04.140 (West 2014). 
323  See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.04.100 (West 2014) (“‘Employment,’ subject only to the other 
provisions of this title, means personal service, of whatever nature, unlimited by the relationship of master and servant as 
known to the common law or any other legal relationship, including service in interstate commerce, performed for wages 
or under any contract calling for the performance of personal services, written or oral, express or implied.”). 
324  Kabrick v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t of Wash., No. 20126-1-III, 2002 WL 91270, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 
2002). 
325  Id. 
326  Id. 
327  Id. 
328  Id. 
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merely by changing the order in which workers are paid and the party from whom the employer 
receives payment. For instance, although Ms. Kabrick was able to keep almost the entire fare paid 
by customers, she ultimately gave some of this money back to Spo-Cab.329 As part of her 
agreement with Spo-Cab, she paid Spo-Cab a dispatch fee and administration fee on a weekly 
basis.330 The dispatch fee was based on working sixty hours per week, and was not adjusted if a 
driver worked less.331 Whether a worker is paid directly by customers, and later gives a share to 
his or her employer, or whether the customer pays the employer first, should have little to do with 
whether one is an employee or an independent contractor. 
At the very least, whether a worker is paid wages is of no greater significance than any 
other fact that goes into the independent contractor analysis. Thus, it should only be considered in 
analyzing whether an employer exerts control over the worker, the “A” prong of the ABC test, or 
in reference to any of the other prongs of the test if relevant. Under this approach, all facts can be 
analyzed and weighed together, at the same time, to determine if the totality of these facts 
suggests an employee or an independent contractor relationship. 
In Kabrick, many facts suggested that the worker was an employee under Washington’s 
presumptive ABC test. For example, Spo-cab trained its drivers, controlled their schedules, 
prohibited them from working for other companies or hiring substitutes, and fined them for late 
paperwork and unclean cabs.332 As a result, if the court was able to engage in the actual 
independent contractor analysis it may have found differently. As it stands, Washington’s 
threshold analysis can be used as a mechanism to prevent the court from reaching the actual 
independent contractor analysis, where it can evaluate all of the facts at the same time. Instead, it 
forces the court to first focus separately on smaller factors that can be easily manipulated. 
The Washington statute should be altered to remove this threshold inquiry. Until that 
occurs, plaintiffs can argue that employers are merely trying to circumvent the law through such 
reordering of payments. Plaintiffs can rely on Awuah II and Awuah III as examples of a court 
rejecting such relabeling of wages, arguing that reordering allows employers to circumvent the 
independent contractor misclassification statute. If successful, and the court ultimately finds the 
workers to be employees, plaintiffs can also argue based on Awuah III that this payment system 
violates public policy, as it forces employees to pay for their jobs.333 The employer would then be 
required to refund the fees charged, such as the dispatch and administration fees in Kabrick. 
D. Use of Semantic Distinctions to Allege Lack of Control and Different  
Courses of Business 
With new presumptive and conjunctive independent contractor tests, many employers 
have tried to re-characterize their employment relationships, incorporating language from 
independent contractor statutes into their independent contractor agreements with their workers. 
First, this Part will briefly explore this phenomenon and courts’ reactions. This Part will then 
address unsuccessful employer attempts to re-characterize the nature of their business to get 
around the “B” prong in the ABC test that requires an independent contractor to perform services 
                                                                  
329  Id. 
330  Id. at *1. 
331  Id. at *2. 
332  Id. 
333  See Awuah, 952 N.E.2d at 900-901.  
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outside the usual course of business of the employer.334 Although there are myriad factual 
circumstances in independent contractor cases, there are common arguments employers have 
made in an attempt to prove the worker does not meet this element. 
1. Contract Drafting 
Under the presumptive ABC test, generally, employers must prove three elements: the 
worker is free from control, the worker performs services outside the employer’s course of 
business, and the worker has his or her own independent business that typically performs the same 
services as those done for the employer.335 Some employers have included language from this test 
in their independent contractor agreements. Employers that correctly classify workers as 
independent contractors may also include such language in their independent contractor 
agreements when it reflects the reality of the relationship. However, employers attempting to 
evade independent contractor laws may use the independent contractor agreement as evidence that 
the worker is an independent contractor, even if the arrangement in practice functions differently 
than the employer’s carefully selected language suggests. For example, some employers have 
specifically written into their contracts that the worker has sole control over his or her work, when 
the employer in practice controlled its workers.336 In Western Ports, the court looked beyond the 
wording of the contract, finding that the worker was not in reality free from the employer’s 
control.337 In making this determination, the court found it significant that the worker, a truck 
driver, was required to clean his truck, obtain company permission to carry passengers, and go to 
the company dispatch center to receive new unscheduled assignments.338 Additionally, truck 
drivers could be disciplined or terminated for violating any company policy, and more 
specifically, for tardiness, dishonesty, theft, unsafely operating the truck, as well as a number of 
other acts.339 Other courts have similarly found that the independent contractor agreement is not 
dispositive, and have engaged in an analysis of the actual control exerted by the employers.340 As 
a result, although employers will likely continue to tailor their independent contractor agreements 
in a way that looks as though the worker meets the elements, thus far it has had little impact on 
courts’ ultimate evaluation. In this regard, once again, courts have chosen to look beyond mere 
labels. To ensure that courts continue to look beyond labels, it may be important for states to 
explicitly include in the “A” prong that the worker’s freedom from control must be found both in 
the contract and in fact, as has been done by Massachusetts, Maryland, New York and 
                                                                  
334  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148B(a)(2) (West 2014).  
335  See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.04.140(1) (West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-4 (West 2014); 
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-903(c)(1)(ii) (LexisNexis 2014).  
336  See, e.g., W. Ports Transp., Inc. v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t of Wash., 41 P.3d 510, 514 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) 
(quoting contractual language that “‘the manner and means of conducting the work are under the sole control of the 
Contractor’”); Kabrick, No. 20126-1-III, 2002 WL 91270, at *1 (quoting language from the Dispatch Agreement that the 
driver is “‘free from interference or control on the part of Spokane Cab in the operation of said taxicab’”). 
337  W. Ports Transp., Inc., 41 P.3d at 516 (“Contractual language, such as a provision describing drivers as 
independent contractors, is not dispositive; instead, the court considers all the facts related to the work situation.”); id. at 
520. 
338  Id. at 517-18. 
339  Id. at 518. 
340  See, e.g., Penick v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 917 P.2d 136, 142-43 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (“[C]ontracts alone 
are not dispositive.”).  
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Nebraska.341 
2. “Course of Business” Semantic Arguments 
In Massachusetts, a number of employers have tried to re-characterize the purpose of 
their businesses to argue that their workers are engaged in services distinct from services the 
business provides. This argument is especially important in states like Massachusetts where an 
employer can only argue that the workers work outside the usual course of the employer’s 
business to meet the “B” prong of their ABC test.342 Under some other states’ ABC statutes, 
employers have the option of proving the workers work outside of the employer’s place of 
business instead.343 However, no matter which form of the statute the state uses, these arguments 
still have an impact where the worker does work in the employer’s usual place of business. 
In three separate cases in which exotic dancers for different employers claimed they were 
misclassified, the employers tried to argue that they were not in the business of providing exotic 
dancing, but rather that the employers were in the business of selling alcohol.344 In the first case 
that arose, employer King Arthur’s Lounge analogized its business to a sports bar and its workers 
to televisions in that sports bar.345 It explained that dancing is simply a form of entertainment 
provided for customers, just as televisions and pool tables in sports bars provide entertainment to 
customers.346 King Arthur’s argued that just as a sports bar’s provision of televisions and pool 
tables does not mean that the sports bar is in the business of sports, King Arthur’s provision of 
exotic dancers did not mean that it was in the business of providing exotic dancing.347 In rejecting 
this argument, the court stated that it “would need to be blind to human instinct to decide that live 
nude entertainment was equivalent to the wallpaper of routinely-televised matches, games, 
tournaments and sports talk in such a place.”348 The court explained that customers attend exotic 
dancing establishments to see exotic dancers, whereas patrons at sports bars attend mainly to 
purchase alcohol; watching television and playing pool are secondary.349 Additionally, the stage 
                                                                  
341  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148B(a)(1) (West 2014); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-
903(c)(1)(ii)(1) (LexisNexis 2014); N.Y. LAB. § 861-c(1)(a) (McKinney 2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-604(5)(a) 
(LexisNexis 2014). 
342  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148B(a)(2) (West 2014) (“[T]he service is performed outside the 
usual course of the business of the employer . . . .”).  
343  See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.04.140(1)(b) (West 2014) (“Such service is either outside the 
usual course of business for which such service is performed, or that such service is performed outside of all the places of 
business of the enterprises for which such service is performed . . . .”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-4(b) (West 2014) (“[T]he 
service is either outside the usual course of the business for which the service is performed, or the service is performed 
outside of all the places of business of the employer for which the service is performed . . . .”); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & 
EMPL. § 3-903(c)(1)(ii)(3) (LexisNexis 2014) (“[T]he work is[(A)] outside of the usual course of business of the person 
for whom the work is performed; or [(B)] performed outside of any place of business of the person for whom the work is 
performed.”).  
344  Chaves v. King Arthur’s Lounge, Inc., No. 07-2505, 2009 WL 3188948, at *1 (Mass. Super. July 30, 
2009); Monteiro v. PJD Entm’t of Worcester, Inc., No. 101930, 2011 WL 7090703, at *1 (Mass. Super. Nov. 23, 2011); 
Jenks v. D. & B. Corp., No. 09-01978, 2011 WL 3930190, at *3 (Mass. Super. Aug. 24, 2011). 
345  Chaves, 2009 WL 3188948, at *1. 
346  Id. 
347  Id. 
348  Id. 
349  Id. 
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the dancers performed upon was in the center of the lounge, unlike sports bars, which have no 
special architectural design that allows patrons to better view televisions.350 Ultimately, the court 
found that King Arthur’s was in the business of providing adult entertainment, and that the 
dancers work in the course of that business because of the revenue derived from exotic dancing 
services and its overall importance to this business.351 
Similarly, in Monteiro v. PJD Entertainment of Worcester, Inc., employer Centerfolds 
argued that it was in the restaurant and bar business, and merely allowed exotic dancers to 
perform.352 The court rejected this argument, ruling broadly that a business that serves alcohol and 
that has a place for exotic dancers to perform is in the adult entertainment business.353 As a result, 
the court found that the plaintiff exotic dancers had been misclassified because their dancing was 
in the course of Centerfold’s adult entertainment business.354 Thus, in the exotic dancing context, 
courts have so far rejected employers’ attempts to argue that a specific part of the business is the 
entirety of the business and that the service the workers at issue perform is not the business’s 
focus. 
These arguments are not unique to the employment of exotic dancers. In Awuah I, the 
defendant franchisor argued that the janitorial franchisee plaintiffs were not performing services 
in the course of its business by claiming that it was not in the cleaning business, but rather in the 
franchise business.355 Similarly, in Network Communications, Inc. v. Employment Security 
Department of the State of Washington, the court determined that newspaper deliverers worked in 
the course of the employer’s business, despite the employer’s attempt to argue that it was in the 
business of publishing newspapers, rather than delivering newspapers.356 The court found that 
Network Communications was in the business of both publishing and delivering papers.357 Thus, 
despite some employers’ attempts to re-characterize the nature of their businesses, courts have 
been unwilling to draw such stringent lines in defining a business’s purpose and have rejected an 
employer’s attempt to limit and distinguish its business from the services that many of its workers 
perform. 
In another case involving newspaper deliverers, the court similarly found that the 
employer was in the business of both publishing and delivering papers.358 However, the statute at 
issue was the Massachusetts unemployment insurance statute, which uses the version of the ABC 
test that allows employers to prove either that the worker performed services outside the usual 
course of the employer’s business, or worked outside the employer’s place of business.359 
Because such newspaper deliverers delivered papers outside of the Athol Daily News building, 
the court found that the workers did not perform services in Athol Daily News’s place of 
                                                                  
350  Id. 
351  Id. 
352  Monteiro, 2011 WL 7090703, at *2. 
353  Id. 
354  Id.; see also Jenks, 2011 WL 3930190, at *3-4 (finding plaintiff exotic dancers were misclassified as 
independent contractors because plaintiffs performed services in the course of Golden Banana’s adult entertainment 
business).  
355  Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 80, 82-83 (D. Mass. 2010). 
356  Network Commc’n, Inc. v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t of Wash., No. 60212-8-I, 2008 WL 1851103, at *4 (Wash. 
Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2008). 
357  See id. 
358  Athol Daily News v. Bd. of Review of Div. of Emp’t and Training, 786 N.E.2d 365, 372 (Mass. 2003). 
359  See id. at 369-370 (referencing ABC test in MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151A, § 2). 
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business.360 Thus, some versions of the ABC test can still be strengthened by eliminating the place 
of business portion of this prong of the test. To prove a worker is an independent contractor, even 
with the place of business portion present, the employer still has to prove the worker is outside of 
its control and engaged in an independent business. However, this version of the test places too 
much weight on the innocuous factor of where a worker performs its services. Although where the 
worker works might be relevant to the analysis, it is likely a factor that may influence the course 
of business determination or the control element, and thus is not so dispositive that it should be 
explicit in the test. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
States have taken action against misclassification, and it appears their actions in many 
cases have followed the most effective statutory models available. While strategies have been 
tailored to the existing laws of each state as well as to varied political realities, the three-pronged 
ABC test and the presumption of employee status have clearly taken hold as the favored model 
for defining an independent contractor. Revising statutes towards this test is a particularly 
effective measure when it creates a set of laws that provide one independent contracting definition 
across all workers, although there are valid arguments in favor of tackling legislative reform 
aimed at certain industries. While states have undertaken understandable alterations to ABC, in 
some cases including additional objective criteria that could narrow the ability of courts to infuse 
the application of ABC with common law interpretation, such variety across states blocks the 
expansion of a uniform standard for independent contracting across the country. 
Measuring the particular efficacy of changes to the penalization of misclassification and 
the enforcement of such laws is more challenging. Nonetheless, states appear to be vigorously 
experimenting with mechanisms to increase compliance with their laws, including the 
penalization of intentional misclassification, the use of criminal liability and stop-work orders, 
and the implementation of successor liability and private rights of action. Given the costs when 
state agencies carry the burden of investigating misclassification, this menu of strategies should 
be adopted together rather than as alternatives to each other. Changes to simplify and clarify 
independent contracting definitions benefit well-intentioned employers, while increased 
punishments can be aimed at employers who endeavor to break the law. Moreover, such penalties 
can serve to invest the law-abiding business community in the state’s effort to crack down on 
misclassification. States should communicate about the usefulness of new measures, as a standard 
set of punishments across states could assist in placing employers on notice of the stakes of 
misclassification. 
While the wave of legislation across states amending or instituting new independent 
contractor laws has made it more difficult for employers to misclassify workers, some employers 
have still found new ways to avoid liability under these statutes. Yet, not every new tactic has 
been successful. Our preliminary analysis suggests that the ABC test is fair to both workers and 
employers, although some improvements are still needed. Repeatedly, employers have attempted 
to use labels or semantic distinctions to avoid liability under these statutes. To establish that they 
lack control over their workers, under the “A” prong of the ABC test, employers have phrased 
their independent contractor agreements to reflect a lack of control. Other employers have argued 
that their workers are not paid wages, as evidence that this control is lacking or that there is 
simply no employment relationship at all. Employers have also used semantic distinctions to 
                                                                  
360  Id. 
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argue that workers perform services outside of the employers’ course of business; the “B” prong 
of the ABC test. Employers have tried to distinguish services performed by workers from the 
main purpose of the business. On the whole, most courts have rejected such hollow distinctions. 
In Utah, Minnesota, Washington and Massachusetts, employers have contracted with 
workers as business entities, such as LLCs or franchisees, in an attempt to avoid both the wage 
and tax obligations that come with hiring employees, as well as the increasing likelihood of being 
found liable for misclassification under presumptive statutes.361 Faced with these new 
classifications, some courts have still engaged in the independent contractor analysis, using the 
“B” and “C” prongs as guides to determine whether such entities are in fact distinct businesses, 
separate from the employer’s business. In other states, employers have been successful at using 
this new form of misclassification to avoid liability for independent contractor misclassification 
because the statute prevents corporate forms from being employees. Statutory schemes need to be 
corrected to close this loophole, applying the employee presumption to all business entities. Even 
if statutes are amended, however, some employers may still be able to avoid liability for 
misclassification through the use of subcontracting. Even if a second tier contractor misclassifies 
workers according to the contractor’s plan, if the contractor does not have a direct relationship to 
the workers, the contractor may be able to avoid liability. Worker plaintiffs can argue that the 
employer is vicariously liable for the second tier’s misclassification, and depending on the law in 
the jurisdiction, they may be successful. As enforcement actions increase, workers’ rights 
advocates should monitor these areas of concern, and advocate for statutory reform where it is 
still needed, to prevent the problems identified from becoming more widespread. 
  
                                                                  
361  See UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-103 (LexisNexis 2014); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.723 (West 2014); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148B (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.04.140 (West 2014).  
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APPENDIX 
 
State Statutes Cited 
California CAL. LAB. CODE § 226.8 (West 2014) 
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-72-114 (2014) 
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-69 (West 2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-
69a (West 2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-76a (West 2014); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 31-288 (West 2014) 
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3501 (West 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3502 
(West 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3503 (West 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 19, § 3505 (West 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3507 (West 2014); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3508 (West 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3509 (West 
2014) 
Illinois 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/10 (West 2014); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
185/25 (West 2014); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/40 (West 2014); 820 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/45 (West 2014); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
185/50 (West 2014); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/55 (West 2014); 820 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/60 (West 2014); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
185/75 (West 2014) 
Indiana IND. CODE ANN. § 6-8.1-3-21.2 (West 2014); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-2-15-2 
(West 2014) 
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-703 (West 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-719 (West 
2014) 
Maine ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1043 (2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, 
§ 102 (2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 102(13) (2010) (repealed 
2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 105-A (2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 39-A, § 105-A  (2014) 
Maryland MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-902 (LexisNexis 2014); MD. CODE ANN., 
LAB. & EMPL. § 3-903 (LexisNexis 2014); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. 
§ 3-903.1 (LexisNexis 2014); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-908 
(LexisNexis 2014); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-909 (LexisNexis 
2014); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-911 (LexisNexis 2014); MD. CODE 
ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-915 (LexisNexis 2014) 
Massachusetts MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 27C (West 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 149, § 148B (West 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 150 (West 
2014) 
Minnesota MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.722 (West 2014); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.723 
subdiv. 4 (West 2011) (amended 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 326B.701 (West 
2014); MINN. R. 3315.0555 (2014) 
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Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-604 (LexisNexis 2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. 




N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:4 (2014) 
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. §34:20-1 (West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-4 (West 
2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-5 (West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:20-8 
(West 2014) 
New Mexico N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-3.1 (West 2005) 
New York N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-c (McKinney 2014); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-e 
(McKinney 2014); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 861-f (McKinney 2014) 
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.600 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.700 
(West 2014) 
Pennsylvania 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.3 (West 2014); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.5 (West 
2014); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.6 (West 2014); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 933.7 
(West 2014) 
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-28-2 (LexisNexis 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-
103 (LexisNexis 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-110 (LexisNexis 2014); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-55-301 (LexisNexis 2014) 
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 692 (West 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 708 
(West 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 710 (West 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
21, § 1314a (West 2014) 
Washington WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.170 (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 50.04.100 (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.04.140 (West 2014); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.04.145 (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 51.08.181 (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §51.08.195 (West 2014) 
Wisconsin WISC. STAT. ANN. § 103.005 (West 2014); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 103.06 (West 
2014) 
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